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L Introduction and Background
There are two core principles in the law of negligence. The first is that negligence
law is a fault-based theory of liability (rather than strict liability), and therefore
requires proof that the defendant's conduct was substandard. The second is that a
person's conduct should be evaluated according to objective criteria,' rather than by
a subjective assessment. Objective means according to some external referent or test.
By contrast, a subjective evaluation would have an internal perspective, evaluating a
person's conduct in terms of his individual capabilities. The standard of care for
professional health care providers has generally been governed by negligence law and,
as such, malpractice liability largely depends on the existence of substandard conduct
as determined by objective criteria. Notwithstanding the overtly objective orientation
* UTK Distinguished Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. J.D., 1970, University
of Pennsylvania. Research for this article was supported by a summer research stipend from the College.
1. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C. 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTs § 283 cmt. c (1965) ("objective and external" standard); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 173-74 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER &
KEATON]. There are a number of explanations for this preference. First, an objective test is more
workable as a rule of loss allocation than an unpredictable, emotionally-driven subjective test. Second,
an objective test better promotes safety and loss reduction by its aspirational normative focus. Finally,
an objective test is more conducive to the overriding compensatory (loss spreading, distributional) goals
of tort law.
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of negligence law generally, occasional subjective currents have been apparent.2
Subjective ripples have also been manifest (and sometimes dissonant) in the law of
medical malpractice.
There has always been a certain precariousness in the core negligence fault-based
and objective principles in the malpractice setting. On the one hand, defendants have
feared that jurors would too often succumb to a hindsight tendentiousness that might
undermine the proof-of-fault requirement. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, worry that
subjective intimations in jury instructions might obscure the objectiveness of the
standard of care, and thereby insulate substandard care from liability. One question
that has proven particularly troublesome in malpractice cases is how to address the
matter of individual judgment - with its potentially subjective connotation - in the
formulation of the objective standard of care and jury instructions. This article will
address this tension as it is manifested in jury instructions on the standard of care in
malpractice cases.'
Although the objective nature of the standard of care for negligence cases in general
has been universally accepted, the implementation of this objective standard has
followed a number of paths. Some courts have chosen a paradigmatic approach
whereby the objective standard is conceived in terms of a putative reasonable
person - a modem "Everyman"'4 - to whose standards of conduct the defendant's
2. Perhaps the most prominent example is the extent to which the standard of care provides for an
individualized evaluation of the conduct of children. The usual formulation states the standard for
children in terms of "a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965). A person endowed with superior knowledge and insights may also
be expected to act commensurate with those superior characteristics. See id. § 289(b) & cmt. m
(explaining that a person is required not only to satisfy the level of care expected of a reasonable person,
but also to exercise such ruperior attention, perception, memory, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment
that the person actually himself possesses); see infra Part III.B. The objective standard of care is also
modified to reflect the physical disabilities of the actor. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT § 283C.
There generally has bean more reluctance to modify the objective standard for defendants solely due
to their mental deficiencies and impairments. See Harry J.F. Korrell, The Liability of Mentally Disabled
Tort Defendants, 19 LAw & PSYCH. REv. 1 (1995). The Restatement has been somewhat ambivalent on
the subject. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965) (stating that insanity or mental
deficiency does not relieve defendant of duty to conform to objective standard) with id. § 895J & cmt.
c (1997) (stating that mertal deficiency does not automatically confer immunity, but mental condition
may rob an individual of all capacity to understand risk "so that there is no negligence"). Courts have
been more willing to modify the objective standard for diminished mental capacity when addressing the
conduct of plaintiffs in Fe context of contributory or comparative negligence. See Alison P. Raney,
Note, Stacy v. Jedco Corstruction Inc.: North Carolina Adopts a Diminished Capacity Standard for
Contributory Negligence, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1215 (1996).
3. I had identified ard briefly addressed the topics considered in Parts II, A and B, infra, in my
short treatise on Malpractice. See JOSEPH H. KING, JR., THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN A
NmTsHELL 65-75 (2d ed. 1986). The preceding text has now been succeeded by a later book in the
Nutshell series. See MARCIA M. BROUMIL & CLIFFORD E. ELIAS, THE LAW OF MEDICAL LIABILITY IN
A NuTsHELL 26-27, 34-36 (1995).
4. Everyman is the seminal drama of the pre-Shakespearean morality plays. See Everyman in CHIEF
PRE-SHAKESPEAREAN DRAMAS 288 (Joseph Quincy Adams ed., 1924). The Doctor delivered the
Epilogue, stating in part:
This morall men may have in mynde.
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conduct is compared and is expected to conform Other courts have taken a more
formulaic, conceptual approach, articulating the standard of care in terms of a cost-
benefit analysis
Various formulations for the standard of care in medical malpractice cases have also
emerged. However, these formulations remain essentially objective.! As a general
principle, this objective standard in malpractice has usually been defined in terms of
a professionally oriented standard that encompasses the teachings and practices of the
medical profession Yet the courts and legislatures have differed on the form that
such a professionally oriented standard should take, and on the extent to which they
should defer to the practices of the medical profession in defining the relevant
standard. Under one common traditional construct, the standard of care for physicians
was defined normatively in terms of "custom" or customary practices and medical
lore Under a customary practice orientation, the focus was upon what had
Ye herers, take it of worth, olde and yonge!
And forsake Pryde, for he deceyueth you in the ende.
And remembre Beaute, Five Wyttes, Strength, and Dyscrecyon,
They all at the last do euery man forsake, Saue his Good Dedes there dothe he take -
None excuse may be there for euery man.
Id. at 303.
5. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 32, at 173-75.
6. The famous Learned Hand calculus is the quintessential expression of the formulaic approach.
See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.); PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 1, § 32, at 173 & n.46 (1984). See generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF TORT LAw § 6.1, at 163-67 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS];
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV.
851, 868-72 (1981).
7. See Hirahara v. Tanaka, 959 P.2d 830, 835 (Haw. 1998); Parodi v. Washoe Med. Ctr., 892 P.2d
588, 590 (Nev. 1995); Morlino v. Medical Ctr., 706 A.2d 721, 729 (N.J. 1998); Rooney v. Medical Ctr.
Hosp., Inc., 649 A.2d 756, 760 (Vt. 1994).
8. See, e.g., Hirahara, 959 P.2d at 834; 1 DAVID W. LOUISELL & HAROLD WILLIAMS, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 8.04, at 8-32 (1998).
9. See 1 LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 8, 8.04, at 8-34, 9.05 at 9-32 (1998); POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 6, § 6.3, at 168 ("A doctor's duty of care toward his patient is to
comply with the customary standards of the medical profession."); Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effects
of Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice Litigation, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1991, at 119,
126; Donald E. Kacmar, Comment, The Impact of Computerized Medical Literature Databases on
Medical Malpractice Litigation: TimeforAnother Helling v. Carey Wake-up Call?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 617,
641 (1997) ("Where customary practice is the rule, a physician is not responsible for noncustomary
procedures and techniques until they are assimilated into the standards of practice."); Eric M. Levine, A
New Predicament for Physicians: The Concept of Medical Futility, the Physician's Obligation to Render
Inappropriate Treatment, and the Interplay of the Medical Standard of Care, 9 J.L. & HEALTH 69, 102
(1994-95); Alan H. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549,605-09
(1959); Clarence Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 1147, 1163-67 (1942); Richard
N. Pearson, The Role of Custom in Medical Malpractice Cases, 51 IND. L.J. 528, 528 (1976); Gary T.
Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L.
REv. 601, 664 (1992); Theodore Silver, One Hundred Years of Harmful Error: The Historical
Jurisprudence of Medical Malpractice, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1193, 1211-25 (1992); Sam A. McConkey,
IV, Comment, Simplifying the Law in Medical Malpractice: the Use of Practice Guidelines as the
Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice, 97 W. VA. L. REv. 491, 499 (1995) ("[Custom plays a much
1999]
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customarily been done. The standard of care for malpractice purposes has increasingly
been addressed by statute. Although few statutes have expressly defined the standard
in terms of custom or customary practice," numerous statutes contain language that
seems (if taken literally) to focus on a standard based on what conduct or course has
traditionally been followed, and thus are at least consistent with a customary practice
perspective." A number of statutes articulate the standard in a way that, at least
greater role in medical malpractice litigation than in conventional negligence."); Note, An Evaluation of
Changes in the Medical Standard of Care, 23 VAND. L. REv. 729, 741-47 (1970); Note, Comparative
Approaches to Liability for Medical Maloccurrences, 84 YALE L.J. 1141, 1148-50 (1975).
The article by Professor Silver contains a useful discussion of the origins of the professional custom
rule. Basically, Silver attributes the custom rule to a blending of the duties of physicians both to possess
professional skill and learning and to exercise them. In the process, according to Silver, the customary
idea migrated beyond the duty to possess to also embrace the duty to exercise. He notes:
It is one thing to write... that a physician must possess customary skill and then, in
using it, exercise ordinary care. It is another to state that the physician is merely obliged
to possess and e.ercise customary skill .... Thus, it seems, the professional custom rule
was bom, not by reason, but by linguistic and conceptual mutation - unintended,
unplanned, and, at the very time of its birth, unseen.
Silver, supra, at 1223, 1225.
10. At least one state has done so, however. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20 (Michie 1992)
(providing alternative formulations including one based on the "degree of skill and diligence practiced
by a reasonably prudent practitioner" in Virginia, and when proven more appropriate, a standard based
on the "customary practices" in the same or similar localities).
11. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-542(2) (1993) ("level of such reasonable care, skill and diligence as other
similarly situated health care providers in the same general line of practice, ordinarily have and
exercise"); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.540(1) (Michie 1998) ("degree of knowledge or skill... ordinarily
exercised under the circumstances ... by health care providers in the field or specialty"); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-114-206(a)(1) (Michie 1987) ("degree of skill and learning ordinarily possessed and used by
members of the profession... in the same type of practice or specialty"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §
6801(7) (1989) (defining standard of care as "that degree of skill and care ordinarily employed, under
similar circumstances, by members of the profession"); id. § 6854 (Supp. 1998) (providing that expert
must be familiar with "the degree of skill ordinarily employed in the field of medicine on which he or
she will testify"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2794(A)(1) (West 1997) ("degree of knowledge or skill
possessed or the degree of care ordinarily exercised by physicians ... or degree of care ordinarily
practiced by physicians... within the involved medical specialty"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2810 (1993)
(providing that standard of care for claims subject to Hospital-Medical Liability Act is "that which health
care providers ... would ordinarily exercise and devote to the benefit of their patients"); NEV. ReV.
STAT. § 41A.009 (1997) (defining malpractice under Screening Panel statute as failure to "use the
reasonable care, skill or knowledge ordinarily used under similar circumstances"); OR. REV. STAT. §
677.095(1) (Supp. 1996) ("that degree of care, skill and diligence which is used by ordinarily careful
physicians"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1908(1) (Supp. 1997) ("degree of knowledge or skill possessed
or the degree of care ordinarily exercised by a reasonably skillful, careful, and prudent health care
professional"). Some of the preceding statutes also contain language that apply various geographic
limitations or qualifications on the standard of care. That language has been omitted from the
parenthetical material following each statute. For a sample of various types of geographic frames of
reference, see infra note 14. Furthermore, many statutes contain separate provisions dealing with claims
based on a lack of informed consent.
It should be noted thit some of the statutory language quoted above, such as the provisions from
Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Vermont, for example, contains phrases that not only imply a
customary practice focus, but might also suggest a broader standard encompassing reasonably expected
or accepted practices. Those statutes refer not only to standards used or employed (perhaps suggesting
[Vol. 52:49
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facially, seems more demanding and normative than the customary practice
formulation. Instead of custom or habit, the standard of care is couched in terms
suggesting a level of care expected of reasonable members of the defendant's
profession and specialty."2 A number of cases, while retaining a professionally based
perspective, have expressly rejected custom as a conclusive test for the standard of
care.3 Frequently, the professionally based standards have been defined not only in
terms of professional practices (whether tied to customary or reasonably expected
practices) but also with a geographic frame of reference, although some states have,
to varying degrees, adopted a national standard."' Moreover, the applicable profes-
customary practice), but also to knowledge or skill that is possessed by physicians (perhaps inviting more
of an expected practice analysis).
12. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-563 (West Supp. 1997) ("degree of care, skill and learning
expected of a reasonable, prudent health care provider"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.102 (1) (West 1997)
("that level of care, skill, and treatment which . . . is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by
reasonably prudent similar health care providers"); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2912a (West Supp.
1998) (holding general practitioners to "recognized standard of acceptable professional practice or care"
and specialists to "recognized standard of practice or care within the specialty"); MONT. CODE ANN. §
27-6-103 (5) (1997) (Medical Legal Panel Act) (defining malpractice clalms to include "departure from
accepted standards of health care"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:2,l.(a) (1997) ("standard of
reasonable professional practice"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-3(C) (Michie Supp. 1998) ("accepted
standards of health care"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1997) ("standards of practice among members
of the same health care profession"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-115 (1980) ("acceptable professional
practice"); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 7.70.040 (West 1992) ("that degree of care, skill, and learning
expected of a reasonably prudent health care provider at that time in the profession or class to which he
belongs"); id. § 4.24.290 (1998) ("exercise that degree of skill, care and learning possessed by other
persons in the same profession"); see also Joseph H. King, Jr., In Search of a Standard of Care for the
Medical Profession: The "Accepted Practice" Formula, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1213 (1975). Some of the
preceding statutes also contain language that applies various geographic limitations or qualifications on
the standard of care. That language has been omitted from the parenthetical material following each
statute. See, e.g., infra note 14. Furthermore, many statutes contain separate provisions dealing with
claims based on a lack of informed consent.
13. See Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 271 (Wis. 1996). In Nowatske, the court impliedly
approved a professionally based standard of care or at least acknowledged the professional focus of the
standard of care for physicians, noting: "When a claim arises out of highly specialized conduct requiring
professional training,... the alleged tortfeasor's conduct is compared with the conduct of others who
are similarly situated and who have had similar professional training." Id. at 270. But, the court
pointedly added:
[S]hould customary medical practice fail to keep pace with developments and advances
in medical science, adherence to custom might constitute a failure to exercise ordinary
care .... If what passes for customary or usual care lags behind developments in medical
science, such care might be negligent, despite its customary nature ..,. [W]hile evidence
of the usual and customary conduct of others under similar circumstances is ordinarily
relevant and admissible as an indication of what is reasonably prudent, customary conduct
is not dispositive and cannot overcome the requirement that physicians exercise ordinary
care.
Id. at 271-72; see also Arnold J. Rosnoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Health Care
Reform, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 369, 381 (1995).
14. Variations have included rules defining the standard of care with reference to the defendant's
own "same" locality, to the "same or similar" locality, to the standards within the defendant's own state,
and increasingly in recent years, to a national frame of reference. For examples of some of the various
approaches respectively, see the following: Morris v. Thompson, 937 P.2d 1212 (Idaho 1997) (approving
1999]
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sional standards are usually those that existed at the time the alleged negligent conduct
occurred."
To the extent that a defendant-doctor's conduct is evaluated in professional terms
and thus more narrowly than under the classic reasonable person paradigm, one might
be tempted to view the malpractice standard of care as edging away from objective
criteria toward accommodating more individualized factors. This professional
perspective is, however, more accurately viewed not as a subtle repudiation of the
objective test, but rather as a retention of the objective criteria but with the relevant
universe narrowed to some extent by the professional focus. The important thing to
remember here is that notwithstanding these particularized rules for medical
malpractice, the standard of care governing malpractice claims has in general remained
essentially an objective one.
Overlaid against this general objective backdrop are a number of formulations that
evolved as jury instructions to address the matter of the physician's exercise of
judgment in deliverhg medical care. These 'judgment" rules have affected malpractice
claims in two ways, At the risk of oversimplification, these rules might be loosely
described as operating as both the veritable sword and shield. First, various
formulations of a so-called "error in judgment" rule (and its corollary principles) were
designed to provide some cover for physicians whose decisions turned out, in
retrospect, to have produced an unfavorable or unsuccessful result but that nevertheless
were reasonable at the time and under the circumstances when they were made. A
second concept requires that the physician not only satisfy the levels of care required
of a reasonable meraber of his profession, but that, in addition, he also exercise his
the same community rule except that standard in similar Idaho communities may be used if standard is
indeterminable because there are no other like providers in community; citing statute); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-26-115 (a)(1) ("recognized standard of acceptable professional practice in the community.., or in
a similar community"); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-563 (West Supp. 1997) ("degree of care, skill and
learning expected of a reasonably prudent health care provider in the profession or class to which he
belongs within the state"); Sheeley v. Mem'l Hosp., 710 A.2d 167 (R.I. 1998) (national standard). See
generally Silver, supra rote 9, at 1226-36. Moreover, while many states employ the same geographic
rule for all physicians, at various times some states adopted different rules depending on whether or not
the defendant was acting as a specialist. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Standard of Care Owed to
Patient by Medical Specialist as Determined by Local Like, "Like Community," State, National, or Other
Standards, 18 A.L.R.4Tri 606 (1982 & Supp. 1997); James 0. Pearson, Annotation, Modem Status of
"Locality Rule" in Malp.ractice Action Against Physician Who Is Not a Specialist, 99 A.L.R.3D 1133
(1980 & Supp. 1997). As the above-cited statutes show, the question of geographic frame of reference
is now increasingly addrcsed by statute.
15. This rule is almast universally followed and is at least implicit in most statutes. It is expressly
stated in some acts. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.540 (Michie 1997) ("at the time of the act
complained of"); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912a(l) (West Supp. 1998) ("in light of the state of
the art existing at the time of the alleged malpractice"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:2, I(a) (1997)
("at the time the medical care in question was rendered"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1997) ("at the
time of the alleged act giving rise to the cause of action"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-115 (a)(l) (1980)
("recognized standard of acceptable professional practice.., at the time the alleged injury or wrongful
action occurred"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.040 (West 1992) ("that degree of care, skill, and
learning expected of a reasonably prudent health cam provider at that time in the profession or class to
which he belongs").
[Vol. 52:49
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"best judgment" on behalf of the patient by drawing on any superior knowledge he
may possess beyond that of his professional peers.
As will be explained, although the rationale for these rules is sensible, their
formulation and application have been inconsistent, confusing, and, in some instances,
misconceived. I propose that the courts reformulate both of the rules. With respect
to the error in judgment rule, I recommend that the courts eschew the use of the
loaded "error in judgment" language and other potentially subjective phrases
commonly accompanying it in jury instructions. Ideally, the jury instructions should
focus in a straightforward way on the underlying rationales for the error in judgment
idea rather than employ shorthand catchall expressions in its place. Specifically and
simply, the jury should be told that the fact that an unfortunate result occurred does
not necessarily mean the health care provider's conduct was unreasonable. It should
further be explained that a provider who chooses one therapeutic approach from
among a number of reasonable acceptable alternative approaches should not be held
liable merely because it appears, in retrospect, that some other reasonable approach
might have changed the therapeutic outcome or prognosis.
With respect to the best judgment requirement, I suggest the following approach.
Physicians should owe a duty, not only to satisfy objectively defined, reasonable, and
professionally acceptable standards, but (to the extent noted below) also to give their
patients the benefit of any superior knowledge or special insights they actually possess
even if beyond that of their professional peers. To avoid confusion and undermining
the objective standard of care, the latter duty should be articulated without using the
"best judgment" language. Rather, it should be stated in straightforward terms of a
duty to exercise one's superior knowledge or special insights. More specifically, I
offer the following three guidelines."
First, a physician should select or recommend (in accordance with informed consent
requirements) 7 the medical approach or technique he prefers based on his superior
knowledge or special insights when choosing among reasonable professionally
acceptable practices and alternatives. Second, a physician should select or recommend
(in accordance with informed consent requirements) the medical approach or technique
he prefers based on his superior knowledge or special insights when it reasonably
appears to offer added safety without significant new risks or compromise of
therapeutic effectiveness. And, third, when the course or technique favored by a
physician was not one of the professionally accepted alternatives or practices, and
posed significant risks or levels of therapeutic effectiveness different from those
associated with acceptable practices, a more guarded application of the duty is
appropriate. The patient should be informed of the full range of professionally
acceptable alternatives or options, and only then should the physician communicate the
approach he favors and the reasons for his preference, along with the other
information and safeguards in the suggested guidelines. But, the duty posited should
depend concomitantly on the courts' willingness to confer protection from liability on
physicians acting in accordance with the guidelines I have proposed.
16. See infra Part I1.B.2 for more detailed discussion of the approach that I recommend.
17. See infra notes 140, 145.
1999]
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In summary, I believe that it is important that the jury not lose sight of the fact that
a bedrock principle of malpractice law is that health care professionals are held to an
objective standard of care. Perfection is neither realistic nor to be expected. At the
same time, the objective nature of the standard of care also means that it is not enough
for physicians to do their best if their conduct does not rise to the level of care
required of similarly situated members of the profession. In order to reduce the risk
of confusion or misunderstanding, I suggest that potentially confusing language
revolving around the judgment terminology be eliminated from the jury instructions.
At the same time, more specific instructions should be used to remind jurors that an
unfortunate outcome does not automatically equate with substandard care, and that the
practice of medicine does not consist of a monolithic single-lane pathway, but more
often plural acceptable clinical choices. And, finally, when a physician in fact
possesses relevant knowledge, understanding, or insights that are superior to that of
his professional peers, he should be expected to afford his patients the benefit of that
knowledge in accordance with the proposed guidelines.
II. The Confusing Exercise of Judgment Formulations
A. Exercise of Judgment as Shield
1. The Adverse Outcome Admonition
Over the years, it has become commonplace for courts in malpractice cases to
elaborate on the standard of care by incorporating various formulations into the jury
instructions that operated to afford greater protection to defendant-doctors. The first
of these rules was bcsed on the underlying premise that a doctor should not be liable
merely because the patient suffered an adverse outcome. This "adverse outcome
admonition" has been approved by many courts"5 and some version of it is frequently
included in the instructions to the jury."9 Its rationale is that liability for medical
malpractice is not based on strict liability principles. Rather, as a form of negligence,
it requires the existence of fault in the form of substandard conduct. Accordingly, at
least in the absence of express guarantees of a specific outcome" or as qualified by
18. See, e.g., Hirahara v. Tanaka, 959 P.2d 830, 835 (Haw. 1998); Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d
810, 816 (Minn. 1986); Frakes v. Cardiology Consultants, No. I-A-01-9702-CV-00069, 1997 WL
536949, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 1997); Morlino v. Medical Ctr., 706 A.2d 721, 732 (N.J. 1998)
("Doctors may exercise reasonable care and still produce a bad result."); Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543
N.W.2d 265, 274-75 (Wis. 1996); 1 LOUIsELL & WILLIAMs, supra note 8, 1 8.04, at 8-53 to 8-54.
19. See, e.g., Hirahara, 959 P.2d at 835; Ouellette, 391 N.W.2d at 816; Morlino, 706 A.2d at 732;
Nowatske, 543 N.W.2d at 274-75; 1 LOuisELL & WILLIAMs, supra note 8, I 8.04 at 8-53 to 8-54. But
see Peters v. Vander Kooi, 494 N.W.2d 708, 712 (Iowa 1993) (disapproving of including at least one
version of the adverse outcome rule in the jury instructions, viewing such instructions as "comments on
potential scenarios in which the standard of care may or may not have been adhered to"). Some states
expressly require some type of adverse outcome jury instruction by statute. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-
26-115(d) (1980).
20. See generally BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 6-1(b) (1995).
[Vol. 52:49
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the application of res ipsa loquitur,2' the mere fact that the results of treatment were
unfavorable should not alone be equated with negligence or substandard medical care.
The adverse outcome rule should be implicit in most general statements of the
standard of care in medical malpractice. The purpose of making it explicit in the
instructions to the jury is to emphasize the fault-based nature of medical malpractice
liability. It also underscores the appropriate perspective for juries in evaluating a
defendant's performance in a malpractice claim. More specifically, it reminds the jury
that the defendant's conduct must be evaluated in light of the facts known or
reasonably available to the defendant at the time, rather than focusing on
"hindsight."'
2. Professionally Acceptable Alternatives Corollary
A second principle frequently invoked to elaborate on the standard of care in
malpractice cases is that a physician should not be deemed negligent merely because
the physician followed one reasonable, professionally acceptable course instead of
another.' In other words, a physician should be entitled to choose among a number
of professionally acceptable alternatives. This principle has been articulated in
different ways. Sometimes it is said simply that a physician should not be held liable
for following an "acceptable alternative,"'u or a course approved by a "respectable
minority,"' or "considerable number"' of members of his profession. Under this
21. See Harder v. F.C. Clinton, Inc., 948 P.2d 298,304, 309 (Okla. 1997) (noting that "[n]egligence
can never be presumed from showing no more than the happening of the harmful event," but nevertheless
finding that the plaintiff had established sufficient facts to support her right to invoke the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur). See generally FURROW ET AL., supra note 20, § 6-3(a).
22. See Frakes, 1997 WL 536949, at *2 (upholding a verdict for the defendant while noting that
"in hindsight" the decision by the defendant was incorrect); Rooney v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., Inc., 649 A.2d
756, 761 (Vt. 1994) (referring to this type of instruction as the "hindsight" instruction). For a discussion
of the problem of a hindsight bias in medical malpractice claims, see Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani,
Medical Malpractice v. the Business Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REv. 587
(1994). Arkes and Schipani define hindsight bias as "the tendency for people with knowledge of an
outcome to exaggerate the extent to which they believe that outcome could have been predicted." Id. at
587. The tendency to apply a hindsight bias against medical decisions may be exacerbated by the wide
availability of medical technical data bases. See generally Kacmar, supra note 9.
23. See, e.g., Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 478 (1st Cir. 1994) (applying Puerto Rico law and
noting that a physician is not liable for an incorrect diagnosis or unsuccessful treatment if his conduct
"fell within the range of acceptable alternatives"); Parris v. Sands, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 800 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993); Hirahara, 959 P.2d at 834 ("It is not negligent for a physician, based on the knowledge that he
reasonably possesses at the time, to select a particular course of treatment among acceptable medical
alternatives."); Peters, 494 N.W.2d at 713 (approving "alternative methods of treatment" rule, but only
if an adequate factual basis is established by proof that there was more than one professionally acceptable
method of treatment that was considered by the defendant in exercising his best judgment); Morlino, 706
A.2d at 732; Clark v. Doe, 695 N.E.2d 276, 280 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); Graham v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d
342, 356 (Okla. 1993) (approving rule, but otherwise reserving judgment on "whether mistake in
judgment instructions should be condemned"); Rooney, 649 A.2d at 760-61 (but must omit "error in
judgment" language); Nowatske, 543 N.W.2d at 275; FURROW Er AL., supra note 20, at 250; 1 LOUISELL
& WILLIAMS, supra note 8, [ 8.04[2], 9.05[3] (1998); Hall, supra note 9, at 128-29; Kacmar, supra note
9, at 644.
24. Lama, 16 F.3d at 478 (applying Puerto Rico law).
25. FURROW E AL., supra note 20, at 250; 1 LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 8, 8.04[2] at 8-
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instruction, the jury must decide whether the course followed by the defendant was
in fact embraced within an acceptable alternative.7 Thus, if there is a conflict in the
expert testimony over whether or not a mode of treatment is professionally acceptable,
that question should ordinarily be for the jury to resolve.? It should be added that
the defendant should also be expected to exercise reasonable care in connection with
his decision. For example, a defendant who follows an approved course of action may
still be liable if he did not lay a reasonable foundation by obtaining the needed
information, such as by conducting a reasonable examination upon which to choose
the course to be followed. Nor would he be exculpated for choosing an acceptable
course if he executed that course negligently.' The physician would also be required
to obtain the patient's informed consent by disclosing appropriate information including
information regarding risks and alternatives, to the extent required by the applicable
standard of disclosre.31 Ahd, finally, the protection afforded by the acceptable
alternative rule would depend on how the court defines the range and boundaries of
acceptable courses, and the degree of deference the court accords professional
standards in general. A court less deferential to the conclusiveness of professional
standards might, for example, decide to articulate the rule in terms of a physician who
reasonably chooses among acceptable courses.
The acceptable altarnative formulation should not be viewed as a repudiation of the
objectiveness of the standard of care for physicians. Rather, it is more accurately
perceived as enlarging the ambit or universe of the range of reasonableness for
evaluating the professional conduct of doctors. This acceptable alternative tenet
reflects important realities in the practice of medicine. The science of healing is
dynamic, subject to continuing change and scientific advances. Going hand in hand
with this dynamism is an inherent pluralism in medicine - a scientific world
49.
26. See Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964, 969 (Pa. 1992) ("Where competent medical authority is
divided, a physician will not be held responsible if in the exercise of his judgment he followed a course
of treatment advocated by a considerable number of recognized and respected professionals in his given
area of expertise."); Fututow Er AL., supra note 20, at 250; 1 LouisELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 8,
8.04[2] at 8-48.
27. See Nowatske, 543 N.W.2d at 276 (noting that "it is for the jury ... to determine whether there
is more than one method of treatment as well as whether the treatment method chosen is among those
methods recognized as acceptable").
28. See Jones, 531 A.2d at 969 (holding that once the experts testify as to the existence of a
considerable number of professionals who support various alternatives, "[it then becomes a question for
the jury ... whether ... there are two [or however many at issue] schools of thought such that the
defendant should be insulated from liability").
29. See Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 815-16 (Minn. 1986) ("[A] doctor must, however, use
reasonable care to obtain the information needed to exercise his or her professional judgment, and an
unsuccessful method of treatment chosen because of a failure to use such reasonable care would be
negligent.").
30. See Clark v. Dce, No. C-950667, 1997 WL 195444, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1997);
Nowatske, 543 N.W.2.d at 275 (holding defendant "not negligent merely because he made a choice of
a recognized alternative method of treatment if he used that required care, skill, and judgment in
administering the method").
31. See infra notes 140, 144-46.
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characterized by multiple therapeutic approaches to a medical problem all of which
may command respect within at least some significant segment of the medical
profession. The following rhetorical line from Alexander Pope has sometimes been
invoked to illustrate the rationale underlying the rule: "[w]ho shall decide, when
doctors disagree?"'32 Despite all the impressive advances in modem medicine, there
remains in it some aspect of uncertainty and mystery.
3. The "Error in Judgment" Language
Had the courts stopped with the two preceding formulations, a good deal of
confusion, judicial energy, and legal resources might have been spared. But, many
courts at one time or another could not resist hanging a few embellishments33 on the
preceding jury instructions or attempting to formulate neat shorthand replacements for
one or both of them. This tendency resulted in the inclusion of a variety of phrases
in jury instructions that defy generalization except for a common a-lement. Most of the
additional language was anchored by the word 'judgment." Perhaps the most common
construct began with the statement (frequently qualified and explained -') that a doctor
could not be held liable for an "error in judgment."35 Other variations used "mistake
in judgment."'36 Frequently, phrases such as "mere," "honest, 37 "good faith, '38 or
"bona fide"39 precede the error in judgment language.
The error in judgment rules and instructions were motivated by a desire to reinforce
the preceding ideas - that liability should not automatically follow from the mere fact
of an adverse outcome nor from the fact that a choice among professionally acceptable
courses of action turned out, in retrospect, to have been more harmful or less
32. ALEXANDER POPE, Epistle to Several Persons, Epistle III, To Allen Lord Bathhurst, in POETICAL
WORKS I (Herbert Davis ed., 1996). This line is sometimes quoted to illustrate the rationale underlying
the acceptable alternative rules. See PROSSER & KEATON, supra note 1, § 187 n.40. Although taken at
face value, this idea does help explain the rationale for the rule, it is doubtful that Pope had physicians
or medical doctors in mind here (or at least it is doubtful that his words were limited to medical doctors).
Some critics believe he used the term "doctors" as a connotation for "[t]he learned." See Alexander Pope,
An Epistle to Allen Lord Bathhurst, THE OXFORD AUTHORS 639 ed. note (Pat Rogers ed., 1993).
33. One court described the so-called error in judgment rule as "nothing if not hoary." Rogers v.
Meridian Park Hosp., 772 P.2d 929, 930 (Or. 1989) (en bane).
34. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
35. See FURROW Er AL., supra note 20, at 237-38, 250; 1 LOUISELL & WILUAMS, supra note 8,
8.04, at 8-54, 8.05 at 8-57, 9.05 at 9-34; Arkes & Schipani, supra note 22, at 602; Marshall B. Kapp,
Medical Error Versus Malpractice, 1 DE PAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 751, 755 (1997); Dorothy E.
Bolinsky, New Jersey's Medical Malpractice Model Jury Instruction: @#! %, Comprehensible to the
Jury?, 28 RUTGERS L. J. 261, 264-65 (1996). Thus, for example, Kapp writes that "[a] mere 'error in
judgment' is not the basis for finding liability." Id.
36. 1 LOUISELL & WILLIAMs, supra note 8, 8.04 at 8-54.
37. Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 815-16 (Minn. 1986) (rejecting a formulation containing
"honest error" language, but approving instructions conveying the adverse outcome and acceptable
alternative rules).
38. Ouellette, 391 N.W.2d at 815 (criticizing the "good faith" language, but approving instructions
conveying the adverse outcome and acceptable alternative rules).
39. Shumaker v. Johnson, 571 So. 2d 991, 994 (Ala. 1990) (discussing and criticizing the "bona
fide" language, although instruction that was rejected in the instant case used "honest" mistake or error
in judgment language).
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beneficial than an alternate course might have been' Given this rationale for the
error in judgment juty instruction as well as the nature of the standard of care, the
appropriate meaning of the language was that a defendant should not be liable for non-
negligent errors in judgment. And, indeed, most of those courts that continue to
expound the error in judgment language expressly qualify the rule in terms that one
way or another suggest that the exculpatory scope of the rule is limited to non-
negligent judgments.!'
Unfortunately, the error in judgment language has been a potential source of
confusion and misconception to juries, and sometimes a tool for defense attorneys
attempting to reinstill some intimations of subjectivity into an otherwise objective
standard of care for malpractice claims. There are a number of explanations for these
problems. First, some courts have not used sufficiently clear explanatory language to
limit (at least unequivocally) the protection afforded by the rule to non-negligent errors
in judgment.4 This c:eates a question as to whether the rule was meant to exculpate
all errors in judgment or only non-negligent ones, and leaves open the possibility that
a jury might misinterpret the rule as insulating all conduct, innocent and negligent
alike, as long as it somehow seems to involve a thought process that could be deemed
judgmental. Second, perhaps the error in judgment language, even when expressly
limited to non-negligent judgments, remains incomprehensible to many lay jurors.
Thus, it is also possible that a jury would misinterpret it despite inclusion of varying
language that technically might be read by an attorney as a non-negligent qualification,
but might easily be overlooked or misconstrued by a lay juror. Third, with or without
some non-negligent-judgment qualifying language, the common use of companion
terms such as "error" or "mistake" in judgment was potentially misleading because it
could be misconstrued to imply that the rule insulated even negligent judgments.
Fourth, adjectives that often precede 'judgment," such a "good faith," "innocent," or
"bona fide," might well be interpreted selectively to suggest that the true test of
40. See Rooney v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., Inc., 649 A.2d 756, 760 (Vt. 1994).
41. See infra note 56
42. See, e.g., Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856,866 (Miss. 1985) ("A competent physician is not liable
per se for a mere error in judgment."), overruled by Day v. Morrison, 657 So. 2d 808 (Miss. 1995);
Matosic v. Gelb, 647 N.YS.2d 781, 782 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (stating that a doctor is not liable "for
mere error in judgment if he or she has considered the patient's best interest after careful evaluation");
O'Sullivan v. Presbyterian Hosp., 634 N.Y.S.2d 101, 103 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Vera v. Beth Israel
Hosp., 625 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). Even in these cases, the context and language
elsewhere in the opinions sometimes suggest that the error in judgment rule was intended to insulate only
non-negligent errors in judgment. In O'Sullivan, for example, the court clearly implied that the error in
judgment rule was referring to judgments in choosing among "medically accepted choices." O'Sullivan,
634 N.Y.S.2d at 104. In fact, the court in O'Sullivan later in its opinion may even have expressly limited
the rule to non-negligent errors in judgment, saying that "[liability may not be imposed 'for honest errors
in medical judgment' but 'can and should ensue if that judgment was not based upon intelligent reasoning
or upon adequate examination so that there has been a failure to exercise professional judgment."' Id.
at 104. And in Hall, in the. same paragraph that contains the error in judgment language, the court also
noted that "[a] physician does not guarantee recovery." Hall, 466 So. 2d at 866. Even the error in
judgment sentence hints r t a qualification by stating that one is not "per se" liable for an error in
judgment. 1, at 871.
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liability is not objective at all, but rather depends on whether the defendant has done
his or her best - in other words expounding a subjective, "good faith" standard.
In recent years, many courts have addressed the error in judgment question. The
clear trend has been to reject the notion that the error in judgment rule should operate
to relieve a defendant for negligent judgments.43 The courts have been more divided,
however, on whether to retain even appropriately qualified error in judgment
language. Courts have expressed a variety of criticisms of various "error in
judgment" formulations. The most common concern has been that error in judgment
instructions have potential for confusing or misleading the jury.! A number of courts
also have criticized jury instructions couched in terms of a "mistake"' in judgment
or an "error"' in judgment. Some courts have objected to inclusion of adjectives
such as "bona fide," "good faith,"49 "honest"' or "best'" judgment language, and
similar phrases. A few courts have focused directly on the 'Judgment" language
43. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
45. See Shumaker v. Johnson, 571 So. 2d 991, 994-95 (Ala. 1990); Hirahara v. Tanaka, 959 P.2d
830, 832 (Haw. 1998); DiFranco v. Klein, 657 A.2d 145, 148 (R.I. 1995).
46. See Shumaker, 571 So. 2d at 993-94 (rejecting "honest mistake" and "honest error in judgment'
language); Graham v. Kevchel, 847 P.2d 342, 355, 356 n.62 (Okla. 1993) (discussing issue of
appropriateness of such instructions but not deciding the question).
47. See Day v. Morrison, 657 So. 2d 808, 814 (Miss. 1995); Rogers v. Meridian Park Hosp., 772
P.2d 929, 933 (Or. 1989). See generally Kapp, supra note 35, at 754-55.
48. See Shumaker, 571 So. 2d at 994 (rejecting completely the error in judgment language and also
rejecting "bona fide" language although instant instruction used "honest" mistake or error in judgment
language); Morlino v. Medical Ctr., 706 A.2d 721, 732 (N.J. 1998) (approving in dicta the language at
issue in the instant case which did not include "bona fide"); Rogers, 772 P.2d at 932 (dicta)
(summarizing cases and rejecting error in judgment instruction in instant case which did not use "bona
fide" phrase).
49. See Shumaker, 571 So. 2d at 994 (completely rejecting the error in judgment language; also
rejecting "good faith" language although instant instruction used "honest" error in judgment language);
Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Minn. 1986) (rejecting the error in judgment language,
particularly subjective words like "honest" and "good faith"; the instruction in question used the "honest
error" language); Morlino, 706 A.2d at 732 (dicta) (approving language used in the instant case which
did not include "good faith" language); Rogers, 772 P.2d at 932 (dicta) (summarizing cases; court
rejecting error in judgment instruction in instant case which did not use "good faith" phrase); DiFranco
v. Klein, 657 A.2d 145, 148 (R.I. 1995) (rejecting use of "good faith" or "honest" error in judgment
instruction).
50. See Shumaker, 571 So. 2d at 994 (completely rejecting the error in judgment language, and
specifically rejecting "good faith" and "honest" error in judgment phrases although instruction in instant
case did not use "good faith" judgment language); Ouellette, 391 N.W.2d at 816 (rejecting the error in
judgment language, particularly subjective words like "honest" and "good faith"; the instruction in
question used the "honest error" language); Morlino, 706 A.2d at 732 (dicta) (approving the language
at issue in the instant case which did not include "honest" language); DiFranco, 657 A.2d at 148
(rejecting use of "good faith" or "honest" error in judgment instruction).
51. See Hirahara v. Tanaka, 959 P.2d 830, 832 (Haw. 1998); Parodi v. Washoe Med. Ctr., 892 P.2d
588, 591 (Nev. 1995) (completely rejecting the use of error in judgment instruction; instruction in
question used various language including "best" judgment); Rooney v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., Inc., 649 A.2d
756, 760 (Vt. 1994) (completely rejecting the error in judgment instruction; instruction in question
contained "best judgment" language).
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itself.' The most serious concern is that an error in judgment instruction, perhaps
even if it contains elaborating language that renders it technically correct (by limiting
the rule to non-negligent judgments), could nevertheless still mislead a jury into
thinking that the rule was that defendants should never be liable as long as they were
exercising their 'judgment." To the extent that a jury might be led to believe that
some sort of "good faith" standard applies, it would run counter to the core principle
of negligence law in general and malpractice law in particular that liability should be
governed by objective rather than subjective criteria! 3 The potentially misleading or
confusing effects of various error in judgment instructions have also sometimes been
deemed inconsonant with statutory formulations of the standard of care for medical
malpractice. Courts have also expressed concern that jury instructions containing
some version of the error in judgment language might invite defense counsel's
arguments that focus on or emphasize language that could direct jury attention away
from objective criteria 5
Courts have followed several routes in an effort to assure that negligent judgments
are not improvidently insulated from liability by error in judgment jury instructions.
Some courts have ccntinued to employ some variation of the error in judgment
language, but have taken pains to frame the error in judgment phraseology in a way
so as to convey that only non-negligent judgments should be protected from
liability. Other courts have decided that the safest course was simply to eliminate
52. See Rogers, 772 P.2d at 933; Rooney, 649 A.2d at 760. The Rogers court noted that the word
'Judgment" could refer to a choice between acceptable courses (thus implying that only non-negligent
judgments were exculpated), or could mean that "substandard conduct is permissible if it is garbed as
an 'exercise of judgment."' Rogers, 772 P.2d at 933; see also Bolinsky, supra note 35, at 280-81.
53. See Shumaker, 571 So. 2d at 993; Ouellette, 391 N.W.2d at 815; DiFranco, 657 A.2d at 149.
54. See Shumaker, 571 So. 2d at 992; Leazer v. Kiefer, 821 P.2d 957, 960 (Idaho 1991); Rogers,
772 P.2d at 932; Rooney, (49 A.2d at 760.
55. See Rooney, 649 A.2d at 760. The Rooney court noted that the final argument of counsel for
defendant-doctor "centered largely on the theme that she did her best 'under fire."' Id. The court noted
further that counsel, "ackncwledging that not all patients survive .... expounded: '[b]ut, that's life. You
[the doctor] do your best, you try your hardest.'" Id.; see also Leazer, 821 P.2d at 961 (rejecting the "best
judgment" language, and noting that "[diefense counsel ... saw the error and capitalized upon it in his
closing argument"); Bolinsky, supra note 35, at 278.
56. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, 79 F.3d 207, 211 (1st Cir. 1996)
(applying Puerto Rico law, and approving an "error in judgment" instruction "that a physician is not
liable.., for a faulty diagnosis or failure to treat if there existed 'a reasonable or educated doubt as to
the [appropriate] medical catre'"); Morlino v. Medical Ctr., 706 A.2d 721, 731 (N.J. 1998) (approving of
"exercise of... judgment' language when "such judgment ... is allowed by the accepted medical
practice," but criticizing an instruction to the effect that one cannot be liable if in the exercise of
judgment he nevertheless made a "mistake"); Frakes v. Cardiology Consultants, No. 1-A-01-9702-CV-
00069, 1997 WL 536949 (Tenn. CL App. Aug. 29, 1997); Fitzgerald v. Vincent, No. 15052-6-Ill, 1997
WL 199055, *8 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 1997) (noting that error in judgment instruction should be
given with caution and be limited to situations in which defendant was confronted with a choice among
"'competing [and presumably acceptable] therapeutic techniques'"); Gerard v. Sacred Heart Med. Ctr, 937
P.2d 1104, 1105 (Wash. CL App.), review denied, 948 P.2d 388 (Wash. 1997). Compare Dupuy v.
Allara, 457 S.E.2d 494, 497 (W. Va. 1995) (approving instruction protecting "reasonable" mistakes of
judgment) with Davis v. W&ng, 400 S.E.2d 230,234 (W. Va. 1990) (approving a correctly qualified non-
negligent error in judgment instruction, but also suggesting that not even a correctly worded version
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the error in judgment terminology altogether. And, finally, a few have attempted
to adopt a compromise of sorts, rejecting the more potentially subjective terminology,
but allowing some use of the 'judgment" language.5'
4. Suggested Formulation
The error in judgment controversy essentially boils down to two questions. The first
relates to the form of the jury instructions, specifically whether to retain any of the
"judgment" formulations. The second is more a matter of substance, and focuses on
the appropriate message - whether an effort should be made to communicate the
adverse outcome and acceptable alternative rules even if the error in judgment
language is eliminated from the instructions.
Our goal in instructing the jury on the standard of care in malpractice cases should
be to preserve the integrity of the objective standard of care, while at the same time
attempting to make sure that physicians are not held to a higher standard than
reasonableness contemplates. To promote this goal, I suggest the following approach.
First, courts should avoid the error in judgment language along with such potentially
subjective accompaniments as good faith, honest, bona fide, and best judgment.59 I
would also include in the list of phrases to be avoided the word "judgment,"' even
if it were not encumbered by the preceding types of potentially subjective adjectives.
And second, the courts should continue to give the jury instructions on the adverse
would be appropriate with respect to defendant-physician-department-head when evidence creates a jury
question whether that defendant's treatment was "grossly inadequate" and whether he ever examined the
patient or reviewed his chart); 1 LOTisELL & WILuAMs, supra note 8, 1 8.04 at 8-32.
57. See, e.g., Shumaker, 571 So. 2d at 993; Hirahara, 959 P.2d at 834-35; Peters v. Vander Kooi,
494 N.W.2d 708, 712 (Iowa 1993); Ouellette, 391 N.W.2d at 815 (rejecting the error in judgment
language at least if it contains subjective words like "honest" and "good faith"); Day v. Morrison, 657
So. 2d 808 (Miss. 1995) (addressing what it interpreted as a misleading version of the error in judgment
principle, but also implying a rejection of any error in judgment formulation); Parodi v. Washoe Med.
Ctr., 892 P.2d 588 (Nev. 1995); Arkes & Schipani, supra note 22, at 602.
58. See Morlino, 706 A.2d at 733. In Morlino, the court approved a jury instruction that had
included the language, "exercise in judgment." The court rejected the argument that the "exercise in
judgment language would mislead jurors to focus on a physician's subjective intentions, rather than on
the conformance of the physician's conduct to an objective standard of care." Id. at 733. Indeed, the
court went even further, noting that "a charge that does not recognize the critical role of judgment would
be deficient." Id. The court seemed to equate the "exercise in judgment" idea with the acceptable
alternative rule. Id. at 731-32. Taken as a whole, the approved jury instruction seemed clearly to
contemplate protecting only non-negligent exercises of judgment. In part, the instruction stated that
where, according to accepted medical standards or practice, the manner in which the
diagnosis or treatment is conducted is a matter subject to the judgment of the physician,
the physician must be allowed to exercise his judgment.... Thus, a physician cannot be
found negligent so long as he or she employs such judgment as is allowed by accepted
medical practice.
Id. at 731 (emphasis added).
59. My recommendations regarding the use of the so-called "best judgment rule" to impose an
additional duty on physicians - thus, the use of the judgment idea as a sword rather than a shield -
are contained infra Part II1.B.2.
60. See Bolinsky, supra note 35, at 269 ("Judgment is not essential to state a physician's objective
standard of care.").
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outcome idea and on the physician's right to choose reasonably among professionally
acceptable therapeutic alternatives. Thus, juries should be cautioned against any
misguided temptation to equate an adverse outcome with negligence or "malpractice,"
and against application of standards that unreasonably impinge upon the professional
discretion of physicians to decide reasonably among competing professionally
acceptable therapeutic alternatives. The courts should, however, communicate these
latter two messages in a straightforward manner, without the loaded error in judgment
gloss.
With respect to the first question - the matter of the appropriate form of the
instruction - it should be noted at the outset that the realities of jury confusion and
lack of understanding are much broader problems. They are certainly not limited to
medical malpractice ;tandard of care instructions. One author's admonition regarding
other rules in the malpractice context is also apt for the error in judgment incantation:
"A rule, which ought never to have been stated, will encyst itself in the fabric of
negligence law and undermine its structure."'" Any benefit from its use has been
outweighed by the potential confusion and misconception about the objective standard
of care that it may engender among lay jurors. Studies suggest that jury instructions
in general are not producing the desired levels of juror comprehension.' Peter
Tiersma comments that "[]ike priests debating fine points of a Latin mass to be
delivered to French-speaking peasants, lawyers devote tremendous energy to refining
arcane statements of the law that mean little to the jury."' Lay jurors are not, as
instructions sometimes seem to presume, blank slates," but rather developed human
beings with preconceptions.' Nor is it realistic to assume that lay jurors are educated
or prepared mentally to digest and process complex legal principles served up to them
in a brief formal incantation. The plight of jurors is even worse than one writer's
analogy to a law school class in which the entire course consisted of a verbatim
reading of the rules followed by an examination.' As another writer states, "[i]t is
all too easy for those of us who are lawyers or judges to forget what the world looked
61. Silver, supra note 9, at 1239 (criticizing, from a fictitious court opinion in a hypothetical case,
the development of the professional custom and locality rules in medical malpractice cases). Silver notes
that "[l]ooking to the past and future, courts must cut away stray threads and loose ends so not to plague
posterity with a legacy of disparate doctrines all of which, when scrutinized, stand for a single principle."
Id. at 1237 (criticizing, from Silver's court opinion in a hypothetical case, the evolution or emergence
of the professional custom orientation of the standard of care in medical malpractice cases).
62. See Bradley Saxton, How Well Do Jurors Understand Jury Instructions? A Field Test Using
Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND & WATER L. REv. 59, 61 (1998); Peter M. Tiersma,
Reforming the Language of Jury Instructions, 22 HoFsTRA L. REV. 37,41-42 (1993) ("Mhe studies...
have overwhelmingly concluded that the assumption that juries adequately understand their instructions
is simply no longer tenabli..").
63. Tiersma, supra note 62, at 41.
64. See Peter W. English & Bruce D. Sales, A Ceiling or Consistency Effect for the Comprehension
of Jury Instructions, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 381, 383 (1997). English notes that "[u]nfortunately,
the art of writing jury instructions has yet to abandon the view of the juror as a passive information
recipient, without prior knowledge to affect newly incoming information." Id.
65. See id. at 386.
66. See Tiersma, supra note 62, at 39-40.
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like before we entered law school."' Barriers to effective understanding thus may
go beyond semantics and linguistics, and involve difficulties not merely with language
but with the underlying concepts. 6 Not only do jurors experience difficulty in
comprehending the meaning of courts' instructions, there is also a serious question as
to how well jurors can bridge the gap between understanding and applying the legal
concepts.5
Notwithstanding the pessimism of some observers about the potential for or
effectiveness of' of reforms in jury instructions, or the likelihood of their adoption,
a number of thoughtful commentators believe rewriting instructions could produce
worthwhile improvement in jury understanding1 ' and, by extension, the fact-finding
process. For example, some have suggested that instructions should be written
according to psycholinguistie 2 principles.'
Of course, the problem of instructing juries is much larger than the immediate
concern here of whether to eschew the "judgment" word in instructions in malpractice
cases. Indeed, contesting nuances in nomenclature by post-trial procedures and appeals
is akin to stirring the ashes of an old temple after it has been repeatedly ravaged by
fires. Our efforts should be directed toward constructing a foundation of simple,
straightforward ground rules that can realistically point the jurors in the right direction.
It may be that the jury system simply cannot do what the legal community continues
to pretend that it does - thoughtfully and predictably distill and apply arcane legal
rules to increasingly technical and complex factual situations. And, it may be that this
society, so exhausted from decades of getting and spending, simply does not have
enough intellectual and political energy left to confront this poorly concealed fiction.
For present purposes, though, the least we can do is not make it worse. One way to
facilitate jury understanding is to delete the loaded and potentially misleading "buzz"
words, while preserving enough in the way of plainly stated guidance to point jurors
in the right direction.
67. Christopher N. May, "What Do We Do Now?" Helping Juries Apply the Instructions, 28 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 869, 870 (1995).
68. See id. at 877 n.46 (quoting Daniel H. Marigolis et al., Jury Comprehension in Complex Cases,
1990 A.B.A. SEC. LrrG. 234-35,288-89 ("[I]t is not the language per se that is problematic for them, but
instead, that the legal concepts embodied in those words present comprehension difficulties.")).
69. See id. at 879 ("Social scientists have found that jurors often still cannot correctly apply the law
to a set of facts despite the fact that the jury instructions have been greatly simplified.").
70. For example, a debate has persisted in recent years over whether or not there is ceiling on the
ability of jurors to reconcile their prior knowledge with the court's instructions. See English & Sales,
supra note 64, at 383-95 (describing the work and findings of various researchers, but questioning
conclusions about such a ceiling, and noting that significant improvements in juror comprehension have
been realized by rewriting instructions).
71. See ii. at 383; May, supra note 67, at 876; Tiersma, supra note 62, at 42.
72. Psycholinguistics is "the study of the psychological factors involved in the perception of and
response to linguistic phenomena." WEBSTEr'S NEw WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH 1086
(Victoria Neufeldt ed., 3d college ed. 1988).
73. See English & Sales, supra note 64, at 383; Tiersma, supra note 62, at 42 ("[J]urors have much
less difficulty understanding jury instructions that have been rewritten in light of psycholinguistic
principles."); Bolinsky, supra note 35, at 271-77.
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Once it is decided to delete the error in judgment language, the question of the
message remains, specifically whether to continue to instruct the jury on the
underlying ideas from which the misbegotten error in judgment language sprang.
Should the adverse nult and acceptable alternative ideas still be communicated to the
jury? A number of well-reasoned opinions by good judges have so held.7 ' And, the
use of these two types of instructions continues to command widespread support.'
' The analysis in Rooney v. Medical Center Hospital, Inc."" is instructive here. After
noting that "the 'mere error in judgment' instruction begs for a meaning,"" the court
stated that the proper focus should be on the "message intended by the... instruc-
tion - that a doctor may choose among several proper alternatives, even though the
one chosen leads to an unfortunate result."'  And since this message was not self-
evident' from the error in judgment instruction itself, Justice Morse basically advised
courts to bypass the error in judgment language and directly address the underlying
ideas: "The instruction would have been more understandable if it had spelled out that
when a doctor chooses between appropriate alternative medical procedures or actions,
harm that results from the doctor's choice of one alternative over the other is not
necessarily malpractice."m Other well-reasoned opinions have similarly urged the
purging of subjective; language, "while retaining a jury instruction on the limitations
of professional liability."'"
74. See Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 814-15 (Minn. 1986); DiFranco v. Klein, 657 A.2d
145, 148 (R.I. 1995) (rej rting language that included "good faith judgment," "honest mistake," and
"honest error in judgment," but approving the acceptable alternative rule); Rooney v. Medical Ctr. Hosp.,
Inc., 649 A.2d 756, 759-62 (Vt. 1994). See generally Peters v. Vander Kooi, 494 N.W.2d 708, 712 (Iowa
1993) (disapproving of the. use of the adverse result instruction, but approving the acceptable alternative-
type instruction).
75. See supra notes 8, 19, 23 and accompanying text.
76. 649 A.2d 756 (Vt. 1994).
77. IkL at 760.
78. Id.
79. See id. In fact, th. error in judgment instruction may even subvert the intended message by, for
example, misleading the jury into believing that selection of an acceptable course of treatment absolves
a physician of liability even if that treatment was administered negligently. See id. at 761.
80. See id. at 760.
81. See Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 815 (Minn. 1986); see also Hiraara v. Tanaka, 959
P.2d 830, 834 (Haw. 1998.) (rejecting the error in judgment and best judgment language, but recognizing
the continuing validity of the principle that a physician is not negligent for selecting "a particular course
of treatment among acceptable alternatives," and the appropriateness of jury instructions on at least the
adverse outcome rule). Thus, the Ouellette court would continue to "caution the jury that liability should
not be imposed merely because of a bad result or the 'wrong' choice of an accepted method of
professional care." Ouellette, 391 N.W.2d at 815. The court recommended the following instruction:
A doctor is not negligent simply because his or her efforts prove unsuccessful. The
fact a doctor may lave chosen a method of treatment that later proves to be unsuccessful
is not negligence if the treatment chosen was an accepted treatment on the basis of the
information available to the doctor at the time a choice had to be made; a doctor must,
however, use reasonable care to obtain the information needed to exercise his or her
professional judgrent, and an unsuccessful method of treatment chosen because of a
failure to use such reasonable care would be negligent.
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To a student of malpractice law, the adverse outcome and acceptable alternative
ideas may seem implicit in the general objective standard of care. Why then, one
might ask, do we need the two rules for elaboration? And indeed, one thoughtful
commentator has argued against a tendency to emboss on the basic principles of
negligence law when articulating the standard of care rules for medical malpractice.
Professor Silver (addressing geographic limitations on the standard of care in the form
of various so-called "locality rules") argues against what he characterizes as "specially
articulated" rules.' While Silver's position would promote formulations of conceptual
brevity and simplicity, I nevertheless believe that the need for particularized
elaboration on the standard of care for physicians justifies the risks to the intellectual
purity of Silver's less encumbered approach.
I say this for several reasons. First, if we assiduously avoid the use of error in
judgment language (and its common and more subjective accompaniments), as I have
urged, the risks of juror confusion are reduced to acceptable levels. Second, I believe
the two messages communicated by spelling out the adverse result and acceptable
alternative rules are important tools for achieving a heedful application of the fault-
based standard of care in malpractice cases. Otherwise, the potential dangers of the
jury applying a hindsight bias' are too great. These two messages might also help
to assuage pervasive physician apprehension of being unfairly savaged by malpractice
litigation, and the pernicious effects of such fear on the quality of medical care."
Third, the explicit instructions on the acceptable alternative rule reinforce the
importance of respecting some diversity in professional approaches. This is essential
to the progress of medical science. Fourth, such diversity-fostering jury instructions
may serve to counter some of the potential dangers in the haphazard process by which
mainstream medical standards sometimes evolve into overly narrow standard
practices.' And finally, the adverse outcome and acceptable alternative instructions
Id. at 816. Note that under my recommended approach, the word "judgment" would not be used even
when not accompanied by the "error in" or such potentially subjective adjectives as "good faith" or
"honest." Therefore, in terms of the form of the instruction, I would play it safer than the language
recommended in Ouellette to the extent that Ouellette refers to the "exercise of his or her... judgment."
Id.
82. See Silver, supra note 9, at 1238 (criticizing, from a fictitious court opinion in a hypothetical
case, specially articulated locality rules in the standard of care in medical malpractice cases).
83. See generally Arkes & Schipani, supra note 22 (discussing the threat of hindsight bias in the
medical malpractice setting).
84. See Kapp, supra note 35, at 752. Kapp notes that physician apprehension about potential
involuntary involvement in litigation might inhibit attempts to discover and address the incidents and
causes of medical errors.
85. One commentator describes the difficulties caused by ineffective information diffusion associated
with the process by which standard modes of medical practice develop. See Kacmar, supra note 9, at
642. He observes:
Although some clinical policies are produced by medical societies, specialty
associations, and government "think-tanks" ... , the overwhelming majority ... are
produced not by a singular, recognizable group but by thousands of physicians acting
individually. Over a period of years, hundreds of comments, articles, and reports converge
to form a policy, which, if accepted by the majority of the medical community, becomes
the "standard practice." Oversimplification, lack of proper methodology, and overemphasis
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underscore the reality that an expectation of perfection or error-free medicine is
unrealistic, and thereby facilitate more constructive self-scrutiny by individual
physicians, greater collegial support, and more effective loss prevention strategies.'
It is not unusual in negligence law to elaborate through particularized constructs
even though those Fame principles may be implicit in the general formulation of the
standard of care. Thus, a number of other aspects of negligence law (not confined to
the malpractice setting) have been addressed by particularized jury instructions despite
the fact that those elaborating principles would be implicit in the basic standard of
care formulation to a person with a background in tort law. For instance, the
Restatement of Torts teaches that "the fact that the actor is confronted with a sudden
emergency which rquires rapid decision is a factor in determining the reasonable
character of his choice of action."" Under an emergency instruction, the standard of
care remains the same with the emergency merely one of the circumstances to be
taken into account by a reasonable person. Thus, the Restatement elaborates on the
effect of emergency on evaluating a person's conduct even though the existence of an
emergency is legally a "factor" that would be implicit in the general rule requiring
conformity to the standard of conduct of a reasonable person "under like circumstan-
ces," with the emergency being one of the circumstances.
The question of the use of elaborating particularized instructions for the emergency
situation has engendered some disagreement among the courts, with some courts
abolishing the use of such instructions, and others approving or at least allowing some
form of elaborating instructions." Nevertheless, just as I believe the more sensible
approach is to allow an elaborating jury instruction in true sudden-emergency
on empirical forms of knowledge can result in unjustified conclusions .. .and....
frequently, if a ccrtain recommendation is repeated often enough, it can quickly become
standard practice This cycle is then perpetuated as doctors tend to look to informal
information sources, such as other colleagues, for answers in lieu of looking outside their
own medical circles for new studies, data, or procedures that may call into question the
standard methodology.
Id. It has been observed that one danger in overreliance on consensus is that it "may do no more than
identify the point at which... errors, oversimplifications, and biases converge;. . . not what is best."
David M. Eddy, Clinical Policies and the Quality of Practice, 307 N. ENG. J. MED. 343, 343 (1982),
quoted with approval in Kacmar, supra note 9.
86. See Lucian L. L-ape, Error in Medicine, 272 J.A.M.A. 1851 (1994). Leape persuasively argues
that a "concept of infallibility" (or a "perfectibility model") of physician performance impedes "insight
and support" by inducing "fear of embarrassment by colleagues, fear of patient reaction, and fear of
litigation." Id. at 1852. A more realistic and constructive attitude would focus on systemic ways for
discouraging, preventing, and neutralizing errors. See id. at 1868.
87. R.STATEMENT (SECOND) oF TORs § 296(1) (1965).
88. Id § 283. Similarly, the standard of care required of a person with a physical disability is that
of a reasonable person "under like disability." Id. § 283(C). Here too, this idea is implied in the general
rule, with one's physical infirmities as merely part of the "circumstances" under which the reasonable
person must act. Id. § 283(C) cmt. a.
89. See Moran v. Atha Trucking, Inc., Nos. 24012, 24081, 1997 WL 751960, at *3-*12 (W. Va.
Dec. 5, 1997) (presenting a useful overview of the so-called "sudden emergency doctrine," and approving
or allowing the use of eladorating instructions on emergencies, but discouraging their use and cautioning
that they should be given "rarely"); Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Modern Status of Sudden Emergency
Doctrine, 10 A.L.R.5TH 680 (1993) (Supp. 1997).
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situations, so too for present purposes, I think such elaborating instructions should be
approved in the malpractice context. Jury instructions that communicate and explain
the adverse result and acceptable alternative rules are appropriate even if they are
implicit in the general standard of care formulation for physicians. Such elaborating
detail is important in facilitating the understanding by lay jurors, especially when they
are confronted with the technical complexities of a malpractice case. While I
appreciate the dangers that a particularized instruction may confuse some jurors or
receive too much attention or weight, that risk is equally applicable to the entire trial
process, of which the instructions comprise a relatively short component.
There is a temptation in framing jury instructions to strive for black-letter terseness
and purity in order to avoid too much post-trial scrutiny. But, that cannot be the only
answer. Such terseness is shortsighted, and ultimately will sow the seeds of the jury
system's failure. Nor should jury instructions receive short shrift on the expectation
that things can be rectified later and if necessary, the case be retried. That kind of
thinking presents its own kind of moral hazard.' Waiting to address the problem of
ambiguous jury instructions until after the verdict has been rendered, often at the
appellate stage, fosters chaos, confusion, and stark unpredictability. A carefully
worded straightforward elaboration is preferable to either the risk-averse shell game
of meaninglessly terse instructions or to the haphazard attitude toward the trial stage
with the serious attention to detail reserved for appeals.
B. Exercise of Judgment as Sword
1. Exercise of "Best Judgment" or Superior Knowledge
Various formulations of the standard of care for physicians have commonly
included a requirement that, in addition to satisfying the objective demands of
acceptable professional practice (or some other variation of a professionally based
standard of care), the physician must also exercise his "best judgment."'" This
requirement has impacted malpractice cases in two ways. First, inclusion of the "best
judgment" terminology in jury instructions has sometimes raised concerns similar to
those addressed in the preceding section.! Thus, plaintiffs have occasionally
challenged the best judgment language as potentially confusing or misleading and
90. See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEx. L. REV. 237 (1996). In the
modem sense, moral hazard represents the "perverse consequences" that may follow from "well-
intentioned efforts to share the burdens of life" or "'cushion the consequences of bad behavior,' because
such may then encourage or promote the conditions or behavior that engendered the occasion for those
efforts. Id. at 238-39 (quoting James K. Glassman, Drop Budget Fight, Shift to Welfare, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Feb. 11, 1996, at B3).
91. See authorities cited infra notes 97-98.
92. See authorities cited supra note 51-52 and infra note 93.
93. Some courts have disapproved of the "best judgment" language when used in the shield sense
to the potential benefit of defendants based on concerns that it might undermine the objectiveness of the
standard of care to the plaintiffs detriment. See Hirahara v. Tanaka, 959 P.2d 830, 834-35 (Haw. 1998)
(rejecting the error in judgment and best judgment language, but recognizing the continuing validity of
the principle that a physician is not negligent for selecting "a particular course of treatment among
acceptable alternatives," and the appropriateness ofjury instructions on at least the adverse outcome rule);
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as undermining the objectiveness of the standard of care. The second (and more
direct) effect of the best judgment rule has been to support an additional ground upon
which to base a claim that a defendant-physician negligently failed to satisfy the duty
of care owed to his patients. It is this second dimension of the best judgment idea that
is discussed in this subsection.
General negligence principles commonly require that a person not only exercise
reasonable care, but also apply any superior knowledge or skills that he may possess.
Thus, the Restatement states that one is not only required to act as a reasonable
person, but also to exercise "such superior attention, perception, memory, knowledge,
intelligence, and judgment as the actor himself has."' The comments elaborate that
if the actor in fact possesses more than the minimum qualities of the reasonable
person, "he is required to exercise the superior qualities that he has in a manner
reasonable under th, circumstances.""5 In other words, "[t]he standard becomes...
that of a reasonable man with such superior attributes.""
The preceding idea can be extrapolated into malpractice cases in two ways. In one
general sense, the duty to draw on one's superior attributes provides a conceptual
premise for holding medical professionals to the standards of expertise reasonably to
be expected from members of their learned profession. And in a more specific way,
the best judgment rule has sometimes been invoked to extend a physician's obligations
even further, beyonl the level of care and expertise demanded of a representative
member of defendant's learned profession and specialty by requiring that the defendant
also draw upon any personal attributes or knowledge that are superior to that of his
professional peers. I will address this latter use of the rule and the potential conflicts
that might be created by a thoughtless application of the rule. I will also suggest a
suitable formulation of the rule.
Although a number of courtsr and commentators98 include a duty to exercise
one's best judgment in their litany of the components of the standard of care, the rule
Leazer v. Kiefer, 821 P'!d 957, 960-61 (Idaho 1991); id. at 961-63 (Bristline, J., concurring); Rooney
v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., Inc., 649 A.2d 756, 760 (Vt. 1994).
94. RESTATEMErr (SECONO) OF TORTS § 289(b) (1965); see also id. §§ 299 cmt. f, 299A cmt. b
(stating that if a person r;ndering professional services "has in fact greater skill than that common to the
profession .... he is rexluired to exercise that skill .. .
95. Id. § 289(b) cmt. m.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g. Pomnier v. ABC Ins. Co., 715 So. 2d 1270, 1274 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting
statute); McAllister v. Ha, 496 S.E.2d 577, 581 (N.C. 1998) (stating in dicta that physician must satisfy
professional standards and use his best judgment in care of the patient, and also noting that these
requirements have been "efined" by statute); Brazie v. Williams, 634 N.Y.S.2d 274,275 (N.Y. App. Div.
1995) (stating that medical malpractice can arise from "lack of knowledge, lack of ability, failure to
exercise reasonable care or failure to use one's best judgment"). At least one state includes a requirement
that, in addition to a requirement that the defendant have conformed to the objective professional
standards, that he also have "exercised his best judgment in the application of that skill." LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. 9:2794(1), (2) (West 1997).
98. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 20, at 239 ("On rare occasions, the courts have allowed the case
to proceed in spite of agreement that the defendant satisfied the customary practice of her specialty,
where evidence is presented that the defendant was aware of dangers in the standard practice."); Arkes
& Schipani, supra note 22, at 601; Kacmar, supra note 9, at 638.
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has seldom been the center of focus or figured centrally in the outcome of a
malpractice claim. Perhaps the most notable reported instances in which the rule has
actually played a central role are two New York cases involving severe eye
impairments suffered in the summer of 1953 by infant-patients caused by retrolental
fibroplasia (RLF).
In Toth v. Community Hospital at Glen Cove,"° prematurely born twin infants
were blinded or partially blinded by RLF caused by excess oxygen administered to
them following their birth. Their pediatrician had ordered the administration of oxygen
because he believed it was needed to preserve their lives and prevent brain
damage." ' His written orders were to the effect that after the first twelve hours, the
oxygen level was to be reduced from six to four liters per minute. Among the
allegations of negligence directed at various defendants, plaintiffs contended that the
oxygen was not reduced in accordance with the pediatrician's instructions, and that the
defendant-pediatrician was negligent in failing to discover promptly that the oxygen
had not been reduced by the nurses as directed.'"
At trial in Toth, the only question the jury was asked to decide was whether the
doctors had conformed to the acceptable professional practice in their specialties.'"
A verdict was rendered for the defendant-physicians, and was affirmed by the
appellate division.'" Although the evidence was conflicting, apparently there was at
least sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that the defendant-pediatrician acted
in accordance with acceptable medical practice by ordering the administration of
oxygen. The defendant-pediatrician argued essentially that, even if the infants had
received exclusively the higher six-liter dosage throughout, by finding that he had
complied with acceptable medical practice, the jury was implicitly also finding that the
administration of six liters without reduction was consistent with acceptable medical
99. Retrolental fibroplasia is a
bilateral retinopathy occurring in premature infants treated with excessively high
concentrations of oxygen, characterized by vascular dilation, proliferation, and tortuosity,
edema, and retinal detachment, with ultimate conversion of the retina into a fibrous
mass ... ; usually, growth of the eye is arrested and may result in microopthalmia, and
blindness may occur.
DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 629 (Elizabeth J. Taylor ed., 27th ed. 1989). RLF is
a progressive disease that consists of five stages, with the effects being irreversible in the latter two
stages when the retina detaches and a fibroid mass develops over the crystalline lens of the eye. See
Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875, 877 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
The disease was first identified in 1942, and reached epidemic proportions in the late 1940s and early
1950s. Since the increase in the incidence of the RLF coincided with the liberal use of oxygen to treat
premature infants, by the summer of 1953, a number of respected physicians began to suspect that
oxygen contributed to the development of RLF. Yet, at the same time, a significant segment of the
medical profession continued to believe that the liberal administration of oxygen to premature infants was
important in preventing death or brain damage. See id. (containing useful background information on
RLF).
100. 239 N.E.2d 368 (N.Y. 1968).
101. See id. at 370.
102. See idL
103. See id at 371.
104. See id. (discussing procedural history).
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practice." Therefore, so the argument goes, any failure to discover that his order
of a lower dosage had not been executed should be irrelevant since even the higher
dosage was "acceptable.""Z
On further appeal, the court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial against the
pediatrician and hospital, holding that a physician "should use his best judgment and
whatever superior knowledge, skill and intelligence he has."' 7 Thus, even if the
higher dosage actually received by the patients was acceptable, that fact did not relieve
this defendant of liability under the circumstances for his alleged failure reasonably
to assure that the safer course that he had ordered was implemented. The court added
pointedly:
If a physician fails to employ his expertise or best judgment, and that
omission causes injury, he should not automatically be freed from liability
105. See id. at 372.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 372-73; see also Koehler v. Schwartz, 399 N.E.2d 1140, 1141 (N.Y. 1979) (dicta,
discussed below). But sec Koehler v. Schwartz, 413 N.Y.S.2d 462 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979), affid on other
grounds, 399 N.E.2d 1140 (N.Y. 1979). See generally Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 269 (Alaska
1975) (ambiguous opinicn, discussed below).
In Koehler, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent in performing an abortion and as
a result failed to terminat,. her pregnancy. One of the plaintiffs contentions was that the defendant should
have used a sharp curette along with a suction curette in performing the procedure. Plaintiff relied on
testimony by the defendant that he always used both. The expert testimony, however, indicated that the
use of the sharp curette was "purely a matter of choice, being purely an alternative," and that the method
actually employed conformed to "proper and accepted practice." Id. at 464. The Appellate Division
reversed a trial court verdict for the plaintiff, finding that there was not sufficient evidence on causation,
and alternatively that the fact that the method actually employed conformed to "proper and accepted
practice" precluded a finding of negligence. Id. Although the court of appeals affirmed, it did so
exclusively on causation grounds. See Koehler, 399 N.E.2d at 1141. Moreover, there is dicta in the court
of appeals opinion suggesting at least tacit support for the best judgment rule. The court of appeals noted
that "[i]t may well be tlat defendant ... routinely followed procedures more demanding than those
dictated by customary medical practice, and that a failure to adhere to these added precautionary
measures in the circumstances of this case would amount to negligence." Id.
The Poulin case also involved RLF-induced blindness suffered by an infant allegedly treated with
excessive oxygen. The infant was in respiratory distress and required the administration of oxygen,
Poulin, 542 P.2d at 256. The dispute centered in part over the proper method for adjusting oxygen levels
for cyanotic premature babies. Expert testimony supported both the method plaintiff claimed should have
been used, and the metho I defendant-pediatrician used. The plaintiff also attempted to rely on a superior-
knowledge argument in two ways. First, the plaintiff asserted broadly that since the defendant was
trained in a "large, prestigious medical school in Chicago," licensed in five states, and board certified,
that he should therefore be required to exercise superior knowledge. Id. at 268-69. Plaintiff requested
an instruction that a physician possessing superior knowledge greater than others practicing in the same
or similar communities was "required to use whatever superior knowledge, skill and intelligence he has."
Id. at 269 n.42. The Alaska Supreme Court, relying on the state statute, rejected this contention or that
the statute set a "minimum standard." Id. at 270. Rather, it held that specialists were held to a higher
standard only to the extent of a specialist practicing in "similar communities" (under a since-amended
version of the statute). Id. at 269. Second, the plaintiff sought to use defendant's knowledge more
narrowly in conjunction with a duty to supervise. The plaintiff was held entitled to an instruction that
if the physician believed oxygen levels greater than necessary were harmful, he was obligated reasonably
to supervise the nurses to assure that oxygen did not exceed necessary levels.
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because in fact he adhered to acceptable practice. There is no policy
reason why a physician, who knows or believes there are unnecessary
dangers in the community practice, should not be required to take
whatever precautionary measures he deems appropriate.... We see no
justification for the position that, as a matter of law, because other
reputable physicians did not think the precautions necessary and did not
view the treatment actually given as improper, there may be no tort
liability.111
The failure to afford the jury the option of considering this additional ground of
possible negligence warranted a new trial.
Twelve years later another New York case was decided involving blindness due to
RLF caused by excessive oxygen given to a premature infant. In Burton v. Brooklyn
Doctors Hospital," the five to six week prematurely born plaintiff was transferred
the day after his birth to a hospital designated as the premature nursery care center.
There, the plaintiff came under the care of Dr. Lawrence Ross, a pediatric resident.
Dr. Ross, concluding that the plaintiff was a vigorous infant in good condition, and
aware that oxygen had been implicated as a cause of RLF, ordered that the oxygen
be "reduced ... as tolerated."" 0
Two weeks prior to the arrival of the plaintiff at the defendant-transferee hospital,
the hospital had announced the conclusions of its own study that "prolonged oxygen
therapy may be related to the production of RLF..' Nevertheless, because the
results of its investigation were deemed insufficient, the hospital decided to participate
in a national human research study attempting to determine the role of oxygen in RLF
and the effect of its withdrawal or curtailment."' The study's protocol provided that
only one out of every three participating premature infants be placed in an "increased"
oxygen environment whereas two out of three were to be placed in "reduced"
oxygen."' Apparently, this method of distribution was designed to subject the least
number of infants to the risk of blindness that statistical methods would permit."
What's more, only sixty-eight of 760 babies in the study throughout the United States
were placed in the increased oxygen environment."5 Two days after the plaintiffs
arrival at the defendant-hospital, Dr. Mary Engle, a member of the hospital staff, on
108. Toth, 239 N.E.2d at 373.
109. 452 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). The alleged malpractice in Burton occurred the same
year as that in Toth.
110. Id. at 878.
111. Id. at 877.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 878. The opinion is not entirely clear whether the infants on "reduced oxygen" were
also administered additional oxygen but at lower levels, or were given no additional oxygen. The more
likely meaning of the court's language is that those on "reduced oxygen" also received additional oxygen
but at a reduced level. See it at 876 (implying that oxygen was administered to the reduced-oxygen
group with "curtailment of the supply ... to clinical need"); id. at 880 (stating that the babies in the
larger group "were given curtailed oxygen, while only one out of three was placed in increased oxygen").
114. See id. at 878.
115. See it
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the instructions of the Chairmen of the Department of Pediatrics,"6 entered the
following order for the plaintiff: "Oxygen study: In prolonged oxygen at concentration
greater than 50%.' 7 Dr. Engle had thereby countermanded the order of Dr. Ross
without ever examining the plaintiff or speaking to his parents. Moreover, her order
was written despite the fact that she had no responsibility for the care of premature
infants and was a coauthor of the hospital's own study that had concluded that
increased oxygen mrght be unnecessary for premature infants."'
As a result of Dr. Engle's order, concentrations of oxygen administered to the
plaintiff were (over a span of twenty-eight days) increased up to a high of nine liters
and to an environment as high as 82%."' Except for faint light perception, the
plaintiff was rendered totally blind.
At trial, a verdict was rendered against Dr. Engle for, inter alia, malpractice in the
treatment of the plaintiff and lack of informed consent. Unlike the initial trial in Toth,
here the jury was presented with the question whether Dr. Engle was negligent in
permitting increased oxygen for a prolonged periods, "even though it was common
practice at the time, when they [Dr. Engle and the hospital] were aware of the
possibility that RLF might result."'"m On appeal, the court affirmed the liability'
verdict against Dr. Engle, holding that the evidence supported a finding by the jury
that Dr. Engle failed in her duty to the plaintiff with regard to both the treatment and
informed consent.'"
In response to Dr. Engle's reliance on the assertion that "prolonged oxygen was
routine practice"'m at the time, the appellate court explained:
Although the conventional wisdom at the time believed that increased
oxygen was essential to the survival of premature babies, the hospital and
Dr. Engle cannot avail themselves of the shield of acceptable medical
practice when a number of studies, including their own, had already
indicated that increased oxygen was both unnecessary and dangerous,
particularly for an otherwise healthy baby, and especially when the
attending phy;ician, who had primary responsibility for the patient's
health, had recommended a decrease. "[A] physicians should use his best
judgment and whatever superior knowledge, skill and intelligence he
has. , 124
116. At the time, Dr, Engle was serving as the Chairman's assistant for purposes of coordinating the
hospital's participation in the Cooperative Study. See id.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. See id
120. Id at 879.
121. The court affirmed the finding of liability, bu  ordered a new trial on the issue of damages.
See id. at 882.
122. See id. at 879.
123. Id at 878.
124. Id at 779-80 (quoting Toth v. Community Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368, 372-73 (N.Y.
1968).
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In concluding its analysis of the best judgment requirement, the Burton court
supported its holding that the case was submitted to the jury on a proper charge,
quoting the following language from Toth: "If a physician fails to employ his
expertise or best judgment, and that omission causes injury, he should not automatical-
ly be freed from liability because he in fact adhered to acceptable practice.""'  I
believe that the above rule as finally articulated in Burton (and taken from Toth) was
formulated in terms that were broader than are either necessary or appropriate.
There are two problems with the preceding broad, unqualified formulation of the
best judgment rule. First, it contains the "best judgment" language. As explained in
the preceding section, that language poses a risk of confusing or misleading a jury in
ways that may subvert the premise that, at a minimum, health care providers must
adhere to an objectively defined standard of conduct. The best judgment rule, as
already explained, should supplement the objective standard of care, representing an
additional requirement rather than a substitute for it. The best judgment language may,
however, mislead the jury into incorrectly believing that subjective notions inherent
in the exercise of one's best judgment supplant the objective standard of care.
Therefore, I suggest that the duty to exercise one's best judgment be formulated for
the jury without the "best judgment" language.
The second problem with the formulation in Toth and Burton is that it could, if
imposed too absolutely, create a serious dilemma for physicians. There is no problem
if the course indicated by one's best judgment coincides with a professionally
acceptable practice. But what if the course indicated by the physician's best judgment
points in a direction outside the ambit of what is regarded as professionally
acceptable? It is one thing to require a physician to exercise his best judgment even
when it leads outside the mainstream practice or conventional teaching when there are
no downside risks to taking an outlier course. It is quite another matter if a rule were
to require that a physician follow his best judgment when it not only points outside
acceptable practice but when the course indicated by that judgment itself raises
significant risks different from those present in the accepted or standard professional
practices.
This potential dilemma can be illustrated by the following hypothetical situation."
Assume that accepted medical practice provides that when bacterial infection "ABC"
is the suspected cause of acute endocarditis, initial treatment should usually consist of
antibiotic "Alpha" alone or in combination with other antibiotics, until it is determined
whether the causative organism is susceptible to it. If, however, there are solid
objective grounds for believing that a strain of bacteria resistant to antibiotic Alpha is
the cause of the infection, then antibiotic "Beta" is to be used until the susceptibility
of the actual bacterial strain has been clarified by laboratory results. Also assume that
antibiotic Beta is a more effective agent for present purposes than antibiotic Alpha,
125. Id. at 880 (quoting Toth, 239 N.E.2d at 373).
126. Although this illustration was based in part on an actual disease, the medical background was
tailored to suit the legal context and may therefore not faithfully or comprehensively reflect current
medical practice. See generally Adolph W. Karchmer & Morton N. Swartz, Infective Endocarditis, 2 Sci.
AM. MED. 7-XVIII-15 (1998) (explaining the medical background on the illustration).
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but that it poses special risks of certain side effects such as kidney damage and
deafness in some patients. Now consider the following two scenarios:
Situation #1: The patient is suffering from acute bacterial endocarditis. Defendant-
internist, based on his prior pre-medical experience as a drug counselor, believes that
his patient is an iniravenous (IV) drug user. Based on the patient's signs and
symptoms, the doctor has no specific reason to suspect an Alpha-resistant strain. He
does have a suspicion, based on his recent experience with other IV drug users with
similar infections, that the causative organism might be resistant to antibiotic Alpha.
Nevertheless, the doctor starts the patient on antibiotic Alpha while he awaits
laboratory tests to determine susceptibility to various antibiotics. Unfortunately, the
suspicion was correct and the bacteria proves resistant to antibiotic Alpha. Before the
disease can be brought under control by antibiotic Beta, the patient suffers sig-
nificantly worse valvular heart damage from the endocarditis than would probably
have otherwise occurred had he been treated immediately with antibiotic Beta.
Situation #2: Assume the same facts as in Situation #1, except that based on this
same suspicion, the doctor starts the patient on the more potent but more dangerous
antibiotic Beta. Drug susceptibility laboratory results subsequently indicate that the
infection was in fact susceptible to antibiotic Alpha. But, in the meantime, the patient
suffered serious side effects from use of antibiotic Beta.
Under a broad literal application of the preceding language from Toth and
Burton,"z would the doctor be liable in Situation #1 for not at least recommending
the course indicated by his best judgment? And, in Situation #2, might our doctor be
potentially liable (depending on how broadly the courts define the range of acceptable
medical practice) for departing from the accepted professional practice based on his
clinical suspicion?
Notwithstanding the use of a broad unqualified statement of the best judgment rule,
other language in both Toth and Burton suggests that the courts may have had a more
limited rule in mind. A careful reading of the courts' language suggests that the courts
may have believed the cases involved situations that did not require them (on those
occasions) to approve as unqualified and sweeping a rule as their language literally
suggested. A narrower formulation would have been an option if either the course the
defendant recommended instead of the standard practice should have reasonably
appeared to the defendant to have offered added safety without significant new risks
(in other words no significant downside), or, the course the defendant recommended
that was indicated by his best judgment was within the ambit of acceptable
professional standards as defined by the jurisdiction in question.
In Toth, the court repeatedly elaborated on its view of the best judgment rule in a
way that suggests that it was focusing on situations in which the course indicated by
a defendant's best judgment did not itself pose substantial additional risks under the
circumstances. Thus, the court gives an illustration of a physician contemplating a
highly dangerous treatment, when "exercising his best judgment .... decides that
certain steps can safely be taken to minimize the risks."'" The court adds, "[iut is not
127. See supra note 1.25 and accompanying text.
128. Toth, 239 N.E.2d at 373 (emphasis added); see also Koehler v. Schwartz, 399 N.E.2d 1140,
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unreasonable to impose upon a physician, who believes that added precautions are
necessary, the obligation that he act diligently in taking the necessary safety
measures."'" Later, the court states that there was sufficient evidence to find that the
course that the doctor, in the exercise of his judgment, entered in his written orders,
"were made with a view toward minimizing"'' the risks of harm from excessive
oxygen. The problem is that, in fact, the situation in Toth as it then appeared in the
context of medical science at the time, did not merely involve "added precautions."
There was concern at least at that time that oxygen was useful in reducing the risks
of death or brain damage caused by the premature state of the infant. Indeed, the court
in Burton poignantly described the dilemma as perceived by at least a considerable
segment of physicians at the time as trying "to steer their tiny patients between the
Scylla of blindness [from the administration of too much oxygen] and the Charybdis
of brain damage [from inadequate oxygen]."'
The opinions in both Toth and Burton also contain language suggesting that the
situations there may not have posed such a stark legal dilemma for the physician
because the course allegedly represented by the exercise of defendants' best judgment
may arguably have been one of a number of acceptable courses. Thus, in Toth, while
the court acknowledged its concern that "on occasion" the best judgment of a
physician may not be "accepted by other physicians in general."'" But, in the instant
case, the court seemed to assume it had a situation where the procedures actually used
"had some reputable support in the profession.'33 Thus, the court apparently viewed
the potential conflict to which it alluded as hypothetical and "not present here."'"
And in Burton, the court expressed skepticism that "increased oxygen was the only
accepted practice"' 35 at the relevant time. The court noted that under the design of
the national study, two out of three premature babies were to be given oxygen at a
1141 (N.Y. 1979) (noting in dicta that "[i]t may well be that ... a failure to adhere to these added
precautionary measures [that the defendant routinely followed] in the circumstances" would amount to
negligence) (citing Toth) (emphasis added).
129. Toth, 239 N.E.2d at 373 (emphasis added). A Restatement illustration addressing the best
judgment rule in the medical treatment context also seems to contemplate a situation in which the course
that the physician was required to recommend was designed to enhance overall safety and, presumably,
posed no significant additional risks. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 illus. 14 (1965). It
states:
A, a surgeon, is about to perform an operation. Because of long experience with such
operations, A has the superior judgment which should enable him to recognize that it
would be very dangerous to use a certain anesthetic upon the particular patient.
Nevertheless A uses the anesthetic in the operation, and as a result the patient is injured.
A is negligent, although an ordinarily competent and experienced surgeon would not have
recognized the risk.
Id.
130. Toth, 239 N.E.2d at 374 (emphasis added).
131. Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875, 877 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (quoting
May v. Dafoe, 611 P.2d 1275, 1276 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980)).
132. Toth, 239 N.E.2d at 373 n.2.
133. d.
134. ILd.
135. Burton, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
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level curtailed to clinical need while only one out of three was to be placed in
increased oxygen." The court then noted pointedly that it found "it difficult to
believe that any reputable institution would permit two out of three of its patients to
receive unusual treatment [ike., reduced oxygen rather than the increased oxygen],
which might result in death or brain damage, unless it was fairly convinced that the
conventional wisdom [i.e., increased oxygen] no longer applied."'
From the preceding analysis, it appears that the Toth and Burton courts may have
at least believed that they had various bases for applying a less sweeping version
of the best judgment requirement, and may therefore have contemplated a narrower
construct than a literal reading of some of their language may suggest. Moreover,
there is a question whether the courts in either Toth and Burton needed to invoke
the best judgment rule at all to support imposition of liability. One could argue that
liability might have been imposed based on duties other than the "best judgment"
requirement. In Toih, the defendant-physician had already exercised his best
judgment. He was allegedly negligent for not discovering the alleged failure of
others to carry out hi; orders. Therefore, his was not a failure to exercise judgment,
but to discover a failure to timely execute it. And, in Burton, Dr. Engle never
examined the plaintiff. As a result, she never established a foundation upon to
which to render a thoughtful clinical judgment."' The best judgment rule need not
have been reached. Even if the best judgment rule had not been invoked, Dr. Engle
should not have been permitted to claim reliance on accepted practice because this
patient and his particular clinical circumstances had not been individually evaluated
by her. A patient should have the right not to have medical decisions made without
any clinical evaluation. Moreover, in Burton, the court had the additional informed
consent basis for liability.'39
2. Suggested Approach
I suggest the following approach. Physicians should owe a duty not only to satisfy
objectively defined, reasonable, and professionally acceptable standards, but also (to
the extent noted below) to give their patients the benefit of any superior knowledge
136. See id at 876, 880; see also supra note 113.
137. Burton, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
138. This analysis is similar to the Restatements position in the spring gun context. See
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) cF TORTS § 85 cmt. d (1965). Comment d explains that
[tihe use of a devio. likely to cause death or serious harm is not protected from liability
merely by the fact that the intruder's conduct is such as would justify the actor, were he
present, in believing that his intrusion is so dangerous ... as to confer upon the actor the
privilege of killing or maiming him to prevent it.
Id. Under this language, one who sets a spring gun and leaves it will not be afforded dispensation by
arguing that had he been Fresent, force would have been justified by the appearance of necessity. A
spring gun user who was not present when the device discharged should not be exculpated if there was
no actual necessity for the use of such force. Even if an intruder's conduct would have created an
impression that would have justified the mistaken belief by the defendant that he was privileged, "[a]n
intruder whose intrusion is not of this character is entitled to the chance of safety arising from the
presence of a human being capable of judgment." Id. (emphasis added).
139. See Burton, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
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or special insights they actually possess even if beyond that of their professional peers.
To avoid confusion and undermining the objective standard of care, the latter duty
should be articulated without using the "best judgment" language. Rather, it should
be stated (as qualified by the guidelines below) in straightforward terms of a duty to
exercise one's superior knowledge or special insights. More specifically, I offer the
following three guidelines.
First, a physician should select or recommend (in accordance with informed consent
requirements)" the medical approach or technique he prefers based on his superior
knowledge or special insights when choosing among reasonable professionally
acceptable practices and alternatives. There would ordinarily be no problem here in
accommodating the duties of satisfying an objective standard of care and the duty to
draw upon one!s superior knowledge or special insights since the medical approach or
technique preferred by the physician would also fall within the ambit of professionally
acceptable practices.
Second, a more challenging situation may arise when a course or technique favored
by the physician diverges from or falls outside the ambit of what are regarded at the
time as acceptable medical practices. I offer the following guidelines in reconciling
the potentially divergent tugs of the duty to follow acceptable professional practice
with the duty to draw upon any superior knowledge or special insights one may
possess. A physician should select or recommend (in accordance with informed
consent requirements' and in compliance with applicable statutes and
regulations'42 ) the medical approach or technique he prefers based on his superior
knowledge or special insights when it reasonably appears to offer added safety without
significant new risks or compromise of therapeutic effectiveness. Under such
circumstances, any apparent conflict is academic since the patient benefits from added
safety with no downside.
Third, when the course or technique favored by a physician is not one of the
professionally accepted alternatives or practices and entails risks or ranges of
therapeutic efficacy significantly different from those associated with acceptable
practices, a more guarded application of the duty to afford patients the benefit of one's
superior knowledge or special insights is needed. This may present a dangerous
situation for both the patient and his physician. Patients have a tendency to defer to
their physicians, accepted practice or not. An improvident therapeutic preference
expressed by the physician that lies outside the ambit of more time-honored modes of
therapy may needlessly endanger a patient. The doctor runs the risk of being found
negligent for violating accepted medical practices,'43 especially if narrowly defined.
140. Whether a particular choice among options would be the physician's to select or the patient's
to select in response to the physician's recommendation would depend on whether the informed consent
rules in the jurisdiction required that a separate informed consent be obtained for the specific medical
procedure or technique. Stated somewhat differently, it would depend on whether the procedure or
technique would be deemed covered by a broader consent for a medical procedure for which the
particular procedure or technique was deemed merely a constituent part not requiring a separate informed
consent. For background on the informed consent requirements, see generally note 144.
141. See supra note 140.
142. See infra note 148.
143. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Vahid, 621 So. 2d 1192 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 629 So. 2d 1171
1999]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
I suggest (with some trepidation) the following approach for this third type of
situation. The patient should be informed of the full range of professionally acceptable
alternatives, and only then should the physician communicate the approach he favors
and the reasons for his preference. Full information should be disclosed to the patient
in accordance with the applicable informed consent doctrine," and in any event
should include infonnation about the range of therapeutic alternatives"5 irrespective
of whether or not such information is ordinarily required under the informed consent
rules of the jurisdiction in question.'" Thus, the physician should not only disclose
information regarding professionally acceptable alternatives, but should, in accordance
with the suggested guidelines, also communicate other possible courses based on the
(La. 1993) (imposing liability based on evidence that the defendant-surgeon's use of a non-absorbable
suture in repairing an anal sphincter fell below the applicable standard of care, and despite defendant's
testimony that his decisicn to use the non-absorbable sutures was based on the patient's size); Charell
v. Gonzalez, 660 N.Y.S.2d 665, 668 (Sup. Ct. 1997), modified on other grounds, 673 N.E.2d 685 (A.D.
1998) (modifying damages). In Charell, the court recognized that engaging in "non-conventional"
practices "may well necessitate a finding that the doctor who practices such medicine deviates from
'accepted' medical standards." Id. at 668. The court added that perhaps this problem could be solved "by
having the patient execute a comprehensive consent containing appropriate information on the risks
involved." Id. (dicta). See generally FURROW ET AL, supra note 20, § 6-5(b) (1995) (discussing
malpractice cases involving "clinical innovation," which the authors characterize as "problematic").
144. The doctrine of informed consent protects the patient's right of self-determination by requiring
that information regarding the treatment be communicated to the patient prior to receiving treatment. In
this way, the patient's con,;ent to treatment can be "informed." The complex subject of informed consent
is beyond the scope of the present article. For an overview of the informed consent doctrine, see
generally FURROW Er AL, supra note 20, §§ 6-9 to 6-11.
145. Thus, irrespective of whether a medical technique might ordinarily and otherwise be deemed
subsumed and covered by the patient's informed consent to a larger procedure, when the physician offers
the patient the option of choosing a technique not embraced by currently accepted practices, fully
informed consent should also be obtained for that therapeutic component. See supra note 140.
146. Although the primary focus of the doctrine of informed consent has traditionally been on
disclosure of the risks of the contemplated procedure, other information is also commonly required,
including information about therapeutic alternatives to the treatment contemplated. See FURROW Er AL.,
supra note 20, § 6-11(o). Although the cases are somewhat divided, there is considerable support for a
requirement that the disclosures required under the informed consent doctrine include information
regarding acceptable alternative modes of diagnosis or treatment. See John H. Derrick, Annotation,
Medical Malpractice: Liobility for Failure of Physician to Inform Patient of Alternative Modes of
Diagnosis or Treatment, 38 A.L.R.4TH 900, 903-04 (1985 & Supp. 1997). Compare Flanagan v.
Wesselhoeft, 712 A.2d 365, 371 (R.I. 1998) ("informed consent is not possible when a physician has
failed to address both the material risks associated with and the viable alternatives to a recommended
surgical procedure") with Parris v. Sands, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 800, 803 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (acknowledging
other California cases that declared a duty to disclose "available choices," but refusing to recognize a
general duty of disclosure under informed consent doctrine regarding treatment the physician does not
recommend that is based on a contrary recognized school of thought within the medical community,
except in unusual cases "involving surgery, cancer diagnosis or . . . treatment or other serious life-
threatening procedures"; and emphasizing the duty to advise a patient to pursue a necessary course of
treatment). Some states evn mandate such disclosures by statute. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 448.30 (West
1998) (providing duty, subject to limitations, to inform patient "about the availability of all alternative,
viable medical modes of treatment and about the benefits and risks of these treatments"); Martin v.
Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70, 75-76 (Wis. 1995) (construing statute as, inter alia, creating duty to inform
patient of alternative modes of treatment and diagnosis).
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physician's superior knowledge or special insights. The fact that a course or technique
favored by the physician lies outside of what, at the time, was recognized as
acceptable practice should be explained to the patient, 47 there should be full
compliance with the disclosure and informed consent requirements of applicable
statutes and regulations,"4 and the patient should be encouraged to obtain a second
opinion before agreeing to the course preferred by the physician. It should then be the
patient's decision whether or not to submit to the outlier course or technique favored
by his attending physician. 49 Furthermore, the physician must act reasonably in
arriving at his preference. Therefore, the course preferred, albeit outside the ambit of
acceptable professional practice, should still otherwise be a reasonable one under the
circumstances."s Such a course preferred and communicated by the physician should
also not violate applicable statutes and governmental regulations.
The attending physician should owe a duty to his patient in accordance with the
preceding guidelines to afford him the benefit of his superior knowledge or special
insights, and should be subject to liability for harm caused by his failure to do
so."n At the same time, a physician who does reasonably communicate his superior
147. Cf. Estrada v. Jaques, 321 S.E.2d 240, 255 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that the "underlying
tort principles of rationality that require informing before operating clearly demand more information
when the proposed procedure is new and untested"). The fact that an approach favored by the physician
did not fall within recognized practices could conceivably, depending on its nature and role in the overall
treatment path, affect its coverage under a health insurance policy, plan, or program. When relevant and
appropriate, this consideration perhaps should also be disclosed to the patient before he opts for an outlier
approach preferred by the physician.
148. See, e.g., Daum v. Spinecar Med. Group, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 260,271 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
(recognizing potential liability for alleged failure to comply with statutes and regulations, to the extent
applicable under the circumstances, relating to required disclosures to patients participating in clinical
trials).
149. See Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 995 (2d Cir. 1987) (applying New York law, and
recognizing a defense of express assumption of risk, explaining that it saw "no reason why a patient
should not be allowed to make an informed decision to go outside currently approved medical methods
in search of unconventional treatment"); Charell v. Gonzalez, 660 N.Y.S.2d 665, 668 (Sup. Ct. 1997)
(discussed in supra note 143), modified on other grounds, 673 N.E.2d 685 (A.D. 1998) (modifying
damages).
150. While under my proposal, the physician should not automatically be liable for communicating
his preference for a course or technique not falling within acceptable practices at the time, he would be
subject to liability if the jury found that his preference was otherwise unreasonable. The reasonableness
of his preference should depend on objective scientific evidence. In order for the physician's preferred
approach to be deemed reasonable, I believe that the acceptable practices must have reasonably appeared
to pose a serious danger of injury to the patient or of therapeutic ineffectiveness, as compared to more
favorable levels of risk and prospects of therapeutic success under his preferred approach. Furthermore,
the course preferred by the attending physician must not have violated applicable statutes or
governmental regulations.
151. To the extent that the duty to exercise one's superior knowledge or special insights involved
a failure to communicate the course or technique preferred by the physician, the plaintiff should have
to prove not only that the defendant breached that duty, but also that such failure caused the harm. For
the purposes of this causation requirement, I suggest that the courts use the same causation rules here
as they would apply in informed consent cases in the jurisdiction in question. See FURROW ET AL., supra
note 20, § 6-14.
152. Moreover, application of the rule would depend on proof that a defendant in fact possessed
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knowledge or special insights in conformity with the preceding guidelines should not
be held liable for so doing. Thus, to the extent that the preceding suggested guidelines
would induce a physician to communicate his insights in a way that might lead a
patient on a path otitside accepted medical practice, the physician should also be
protected from liability. But, unless the courts or legislatures are willing to confer
such protection from liability, the physician should not be required, at his peril, to
communicate therapeutic courses or techniques to his patient that are outside the ambit
of acceptable profes,;ional practice. In any event, if the courts define the range of
acceptable professional practice with sufficient breadth and flexibility, as I believe they
should, the occasion; in which a physician's superior knowledge or special insights
would lead outside a broadly conceived range of acceptable professional practice
should rarely arise."
III. Conclusion
A central principle in both negligence law generally and in the rules regarding the
malpractice liability of physicians specifically is that a person's conduct should be
evaluated according to objective criteria, rather than by a subjective assessment.
Notwithstanding this objective focus, occasional subjective currents have moved
beneath the surface not only in negligence cases generally, but also in the area of
medical malpractice. One question that has proven particularly troublesome in
malpractice cases is the how to address the matter of individual judgment, with its
potentially subjective connotation, in the formulation of the objective standard of care
and jury instructions.
The standard of care governing malpractice claims against physicians has largely
remained an objective one. Overlaid against this general, objective backdrop are a
number of constructs that have evolved, usually as jury instructions, to address the
matter of the physician's exercise of judgment in delivering medical care. These
'Judgment" rules have affected malpractice claims in two ways. First, various
formulations of a so-called "error in judgment" rule and its underlying corollary
principles were designed to provide some cover for physicians whose decisions turned
out in retrospect to haive been unfavorable but nevertheless were reasonable at the time
and under the circumstances. A second and less commonly invoked construct requires
that the physician not only satisfy the levels of care required of a reasonable member
superior knowledge or insights. Thus, for example, the rule was not applied against the defendant-
ophthalmologist in Toth because there was no evidence that he actually thought that the treatment the
children were scheduled to receive was particularly dangerous. See Toth v. Community Hosp. at Glen
Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368, 375 (N.Y. 1968). Liability would require, inter alia, either that the physician did
not draw upon that knowledge or, if he did, that he failed to accord his patient the benefit of that
knowledge under the preceding guidelines despite having decided that a different course was preferable,
and that such failure caued the harm in question.
153. See Hood v. Ph'llips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977) (adopting a formulation of the standard
of care based on what a 'reasonable... member of the medical profession would undertake under...
similar circumstances," and recognizing that physicians should be allowed sufficient latitude for
reasonable innovation wlfen appropriate in order that "medical science can provide greater benefits for
humankind").
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of his profession, but in addition also exercise his "best judgment" on behalf of the
patient.
Although the rationales for the two preceding sets of rules are sensible, the
application of the rules has been inconsistent, confusing, and overly broad. I have
proposed that the courts reformulate the rules. With respect to the error in judgment
rule, I recommend that the courts eschew the use of the loaded "judgment" word and
various other potentially misleading phrases commonly accompanying it in jury
instructions. Ideally, the jury instructions should focus in a straightforward way on the
underlying rationales for the error in judgment idea rather than employ shorthand,
catchall expressions in its place. Specifically, the jury should be told that the fact that
an unfortunate result occurred does not necessarily mean the health care provider's
conduct was unreasonable or constituted "malpractice." It should further be explained
that a provider who chooses one approach among reasonable, professionally acceptable
alternative therapeutic approaches should not be held liable merely because it appears,
in retrospect, that some other reasonable approach might have changed the therapeutic
outcome or prognosis.
With respect to the best judgment requirement, I suggest the following approach.
Physicians should owe a duty, not only to satisfy objectively defined, reasonable, and
professionally acceptable standards, but in addition (to the extent noted below) to give
their patients the benefit of any superior knowledge or special insights they actually
possess, even if beyond that of their professional peers. To avoid confusion and
undermining the objective standard of care, the latter duty should be articulated
without using the "best judgment" language. Rather, it should be stated in straightfor-
ward terms of a duty to exercise one's superior knowledge or special insights. More
specifically, I offer the following three guidelines.
First, a physician should select or recommend (in accordance with informed consent
requirements) the medical approach or technique he prefers based on his superior
knowledge or special insight when choosing among reasonable, professionally
acceptable practices and alternatives. Second, a physician should select or recommend
(in accordance with informed consent requirements) the medical approach or technique
he prefers based on his superior knowledge or special insight when it reasonably
appears to offer added safety without significant new risks or compromise of
therapeutic effectiveness. And, third, when the course or technique favored by a
physician is not one of the professionally accepted alternatives or practices, and poses
a significant risk or level of therapeutic effectiveness different from those associated
with acceptable practices, a more guarded application of the duty is appropriate. The
patient should be informed of the full range of professionally acceptable alternatives
or options, and only then should the physician communicate the approach he favors
and the reasons for his preference along with the other information and safeguards in
the suggested guidelines. But, the duty posited should depend concomitantly on the
courts' willingness to confer protection from liability on physicians acting in
accordance with the guidelines I have proposed.
It is important that the jury not lose sight of the fact that a bedrock principle of
malpractice law is that health care professionals are held to an objective standard of
care. Perfection is neither realistic nor should it be expected. However, the objective
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nature of the standard of care also means that it is not enough for physicians to do
their best if their conduct does not rise to the level of care required of similarly
situated members of the profession. Specific instructions should be used to remind
jurors that an unfortunate outcome does not automatically equate with substandard
care, and that the practice of medicine does not consist of a monolithic single-lane
pathway, but of plural acceptable clinical choices. Finally, when a physician possesses
knowledge or understanding that is superior to that of his professional peers, he should
be expected to draw upon that knowledge for the benefit of his patients in accordance
with the preceding guidelines.
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